Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

398. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)¹

Honolulu, December 11, 1968, 0320Z.

110320Z. Prairie Fire (U). A. CINCPAC 070502Z Dec 68 (Notal); B. COMUSMACV 16836/090158Z Dec 68 (Notal); C. CINCPAC 020910Z Nov 68;² D. AmEmb Vientiane 10045/030642Z Nov 68;³ E.CINCPAC 202321Z Nov 68;⁴ F.CAS Vientiane 030553Z Dec 68;⁵ G. COMUSMACV 16905/101102Z Dec 68 (BOM) (PASEP) (Notal).4

1. Ref A cited an exchange of messages (Refs C thru F) with Ambassador Sullivan concerning a COMUSMACV and CINCPAC proposal to expand the Prairie Fire area of operations (PFAO) to include the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes. Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurred. Ref A further requested Abe’s [General Creighton Abrams] comments concerning the effectiveness of present air operations in Laos and the feasibility of seeking authority to conduct Prairie Fire operations in the proposed area on a case by case basis. Ref B strongly recommended that authority be obtained to employ PF assets without restriction in the proposed areas around the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes.

2. Ambassador Sullivan’s objections as expressed in Refs D and F and our comments follow:

A. Ambassador Sullivan stated that operations conducted in the positive control area (PCA) will have to be limited and, therefore have optimal estimated effective returns for the risk involved. Ambassador Sullivan stated he had pulled CAS assets out of these areas to permit greater latitude of air operations and did not intend to reverse this procedure for Prairie Fire. Comment: Prairie Fire operations in these areas will comply with PCA rules. Prairie Fire insertions and air operations in proposed areas can be coordinated as they are now in the present PFAO. The interdiction effort we are making in Laos should be the maximum we can devise and target selection is an absolutely vital part of this program. The value of Prairie Fire teams is that they afford a real time target acquisition, reporting and exploitation capability which CAS teams do not possess. The U.S. led Prairie Fire teams can move quickly to and from areas, direct air strikes on targets on opportunity through secure voice communications (PRC-77 and KY–38), perform ground operations against selected targets, emplace mines and sensors, conduct wiretap operations, seize and evacuate prisoners, and report critical intelligence information. Another major advantage is that both ground and air operations will be controlled by a single headquarters. What is required immediately is U.S. led personnel on the ground that can search beneath the jungle canopy, uncover truck parking areas, locate portering points, identify road by-passes, pinpoint troop concentrations and report these findings directly to the FAC in an understandable language using familiar terminologies. This is the kind of ground-to-air communication and coordination that is urgently required and essential to effective interdiction operations.

B. Ambassador Sullivan expressed a concern for the political sensitivity of additional U.S. personnel in Laos, stating that this could result in jeopardizing our present operational understandings if an unauthorized ground operation were exposed. Comment: The proposed PF areas are under NVA rather than FAR control. The NVA has consistently denied its use of Laos and it is highly unlikely that PF operations would be surfaced by the NVA.

C. Ambassador Sullivan stated that he does not mix CAS road watch teams (which conduct passive intelligence) and special guerrilla teams (which carry out pre-planned raids and ambushes). Guerrilla actions cause the enemy to react and sweep the intelligence teams from their zones. He indicated that PF teams, while having an intelligence mission, are primarily guerrilla and should not operate in the same areas as CAS road watch teams. Comment: Concur that PF and CAS teams should not operate in the same area. In view of the benefits to be gained by Prairie Fire operations, I support Abe in strongest terms, the objective must be to gather the best possible targeting information. The threat to his command requires it. This is substantiated by the fact that the Lao Panhandle enemy logistics activity since 1 Nov 68 has reflected a significant increase in intensity. It is estimated that enemy vehicle movements southbound in the Lao Panhandle have moved 300 short tons per day. The Arc Light and TAC air efforts alone have not been able to stop this traffic. A maximum effort is called for, of which the PFAO expansion is an integral part.

3. An additional factor bearing on this request is the significant increase in NVA/VC air defense activity in Laos. The annual dry-season increase in NVN anti-aircraft capabilities in the Lao Panhandle is far greater than that of the past years. This trend is expected to continue, especially along primary supply routes. Communist air defenses in Laos still rely for the most part on the 37mm AA gun but a considerable increase in smaller-caliber automatic weapons and larger-caliber guns has been noted. The longer we delay full exploitation of our air-to-ground capability, including PF initiated strikes, the more difficult it will become to penetrate these areas.

4. Additional detailed supporting rationale is contained in Ref G.

5. Recommend that authority be obtained as expeditiously as possible, to permit expansion of the PFAO as outlined in Ref E.

6. Very respectfully and warm regards.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, No. 1984. Top Secret; Limdis; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams and Sullivan.
2. References A–C have not been found, but are summarized in the text below.
3. Not found.
4. Not found, but summarized below.
5. Document 397.