391. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
10177. 1. In our responses to requests for intelligence estimates and for contributions to planning documents, we have consistently projected for the foreseeable future a level of enemy military activity in Laos roughly comparable to that which we have experienced in the past few years. Since these projections have occasionally been questioned I thought it might be useful to elaborate the rationale on which they are based. Needless to say, if the rationale proves in error, the projections lose their value. Hence, I feel it is important that addressees should weigh these premises.
2. I start from the premise that the North Vietnamese have failed in their objective to gain a military victory in the south by the massive introduction of main force units. I assume that they recognize the fact that the more they put in and the higher they raise the level of conventional combat, the greater are their losses to superior American firepower. They have therefore apparently decided to desist from further “escalation” of conventional combat in the south and move back to a clandestine guerrilla situation.2
3. Their purpose in doing this is to “de-Americanize” the war by persuading U.S. authorities that it is feasible to withdraw U.S. forces from the south. Since their basic objective is to get these forces irrevocably out, they recognize that they must pay some price for this. But they hope to keep that price low enough that it will not curtail their ability to maintain an effective guerrilla presence in the south which can eventually destroy the political and military fabric of a weak southern regime.
4. Our purpose, on the other hand, must be to exact such a high price from them, and at the same time repair the weaknesses of the southern regime, that we leave a balance on the departure of our troops which is firmly and irrevocably favorable to the south, and destined to defeat northern ambitions in that republic.
[Page 767]5. Since their concentrated and overriding purpose is to get U.S. forces out of the south, it follows that Hanoi must comport itself in such a way as to convey to us a confidence that we can safely remove our forces without scuttling our objectives. It would be counter-productive for them to launch major conventional attacks while this negotiating process is going on. Anything which convinces the U.S. that it must retain its troops in South Viet Nam is a defeat for the north, since U.S. troops are the immovable obstacle to their military success.
6. If this logic is true in South Viet Nam, it is equally applicable to Laos. For the North Vietnamese to “de-escalate” conventional operations in the south, but to step them up in Laos runs the risk of providing Washington with confused signals which could only deter or delay any moves to reduce U.S. troop presence in the South.
7. Therefore, we have risked the calculation in our projections that no dramatic changes will ensue in North Vietnamese military operations in Laos while the Paris talks remain active. Anti-aircraft density may well be augmented to match our new levels of air activity. Psychological and political activity may also expand. But if ground warfare steps up dramatically over the normal dry season levels, then our premises and projections will both prove wrong.
8. The fact that it is altogether possible we could be wrong seems, in my judgment, to require some study in Washington and Paris.
9. I feel we ought to have some way of correlating negotiating attitudes to the North Vietnamese with the pattern of their behavior in Laos. I assume there is some such correlation with the pattern of their behavior in South Viet Nam. I would commend to Washington and our Paris negotiators that this contingency also be extended to cover the more unpleasant possibilities in Laos.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for HARVAN (Harriman and Vance, the U.S. negotiators in Paris), Saigon, and CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 42583 from Saigon, November 13, the Embassy in Vietnam stated that although it agreed with much of Vientiane’s analysis, it believed it emphasized too strongly North Vietnamese willingness to persuade the U.S. that it would be safe to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. The Embassy in Saigon suggested that North Vietnam was prepared to persuade the United States that it could not win in Vietnam by a continuing military effort. Saigon did not believe that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong would revert to “clandestine guerrilla activity.” (Ibid.)↩