Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

384. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach¹

Washington, October 9, 1968.

SUBJECT

• CIA Analysis of the Military Situation in Laos

The attached CIA report² focuses on the military situation in Laos since the onset of the current rainy season last June. It states that during the last dry season, November 1967 to May 1968, Communist forces were able to inflict the worst defeats upon the Royal Lao Government (RLG) forces since 1962 and to erase much of the latter’s hard-earned gains of the past five years. While some gains have been made by the government since June, the Communists remain in a stronger position than they have ever been at any time since 1963 and probably possess more than enough resources to drive RLG troops to the Mekong, should they choose to do so. However, the Communists do not appear willing to turn on the pressure at the risk of inviting greater US participation and, in the near future at least, will more likely take only those measures needed to protect current holdings and to keep open the infiltration routes to South Vietnam.

This is a sound, though brief assessment of the current military situation in Laos. While noting the limitations of Communist strategy in Laos, CIA has put the emphasis, and perhaps rightfully so, on the significant gains scored by the enemy—a development to some extent overshadowed by the more dramatic events in South Vietnam since Tet. Much of the improved Communist posture has been related directly to military requirements in northern Laos, but, as the CIA report points out, the situation has been gloomier for the government in southern Laos where perhaps the main objective of enemy dry-season efforts was to protect and expand Communist infiltration routes into South Vietnam.

However, having stated this, CIA could have gone much further than it did to underscore the point. For example, while acknowledging Communist road building activity in northern Laos, the report fails to mention that a far greater effort was made in the panhandle, resulting in the construction of five new cross-border routes connecting the north-south trucklines in Laos with Communist base areas in South Vietnam. The improvement in the Communist road system in the Laos panhandle has undoubtedly facilitated the unprecedented level of supplies moving toward South Vietnam during the greater part of 1968, as shown in the attached chart on Communist truck sightings.³ Without a logistical effort of this magnitude, the Communists could have hardly undertaken the accelerated military offensives launched this year in South Vietnam.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Memos, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
2. For the summary portion, see Document 380.
3. The attached chart indicated that truck sightings in 1967–1968 followed this progression: 992 in October 1967; 4,234 in November 1967; 6,024 in December 1967; 6,734 in January 1968; 5,094 in February 1968; 5,933 in March 1968; 9,198 in April 1968; thereafter dropping almost steadily to 962 in August 1968.