381. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
Vientiane, September 26, 1968,
0451Z.
9308. Dept pass Saigon for Bunker and Berger. Paris for Harriman.2 Eyes Only for Bundy. Ref: State 244745.3
- 1.
- My discussions with Souvanna re bombing in Laos if and when we cease bombing North Viet Nam have been categoric and specific. I believe situation therefore is clear and that he has stipulated his willingness to let us throw into Laos the entire weight of both tactical air and Arc Light effort which would be available as result cessation of NVN operations.
- 2.
- Such strikes would, of course, have to be conducted within rules of engagement which currently apply in Laos. However, in area of maximum US–GVN interest, along Ho Chi Minh Trail, these rules provide all flexibility we need for maximum effectiveness.
- 3.
- It should be understood, especially if cessation occurs in dry season when enemy pressure is heaviest against RLG territory, that there may also need to be an increase of U.S. air effort against regions and objectives (i.e. north Laos) which are not of direct and immediate interest to MACV. This means that, in order to maintain full level of Souvanna’s collaboration on this matter, U.S. may have to divert some resources to strikes which are primarily of RLG, rather than US–GVN interest. This would be small price to pay, and very minimal proportion of total effort available. However, I think it important to crank this element into our planning.
- 4.
- Finally, having said all this, I think we should also realistically assume that Souvanna’s current staunch position will come under considerable [Page 744] strain when the moment of truth arrives. We can expect the full force of the Hanoi propaganda claque world-wide, to turn on Souvanna and the RLG in effort to get bombing lifted in Laos as well as NVN. We can expect Soviets to bring considerable squeeze to bear upon him. On recent form, we should also probably expect de Gaulle and U Thant to have a go.
- 5.
- Whether Souvanna will falter under this sort of onslaught is hard to say. The King, I feel, will stay steady and so will most of his Ministers. However, if press attention becomes too acute, and especially if U.S. “spokesmen” begin admitting what we are doing, he may find reason to waffle on the grounds that our understandings with him re air operations are based on assurances that U.S. will not undercut “deniability” of U.S. air operations in Laos. Therefore, in contingency we are discussing, tightest possible control of U.S. spokesmen will be at a premium.
- 6.
- In summary, I would say our current arrangements are sound. How watertight they will prove in the event is yet to be tested. I believe the test will be conditioned by (a) the season of the year (Hanoi military counter-pressures can be heaviest in dry season), (b) the duration of that period when Laos alone is conspicuously being bombed and no general cease-fire is achieved, and (c) the intensity of the campaign mounted against Souvanna by Hanoi and its claque.
Sullivan