Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

360. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, April 24, 1968, 0942Z.

6025. Ref: State 151990.²

1. Reftel advises that highest level has authorized Haymaker operation, in Base Area 607 and asks my views about handling with Souvanna.

2. As far as discussion in advance with Souvanna, answer is categorically negative. He would have to oppose it, possibly in public. We would then have to reconsider, or else defy his sovereignty.

3. I am relieved that policy will be to “refrain from all U.S. official comment,” but I share your doubts that this will work. Therefore, assume there will be leaks which will have to be handled in some fashion.JCS has directed that there be “No admission that forces have crossed the border.” This is a good, sound and simple directive and I hope we can stand on it.

4. In the contingency that some superior conscience feels an “admission” has to be made, I would foresee various complications:

(A) Souvanna would ask for an explanation privately, and would be harassed both by press and by unfriendly diplomats for public expression of disapproval. If level of public evidence is high enough, he will have to make a protest.

(B) Our explanation, if we have to give one, should be based on “swirl of battle” and vagueness of frontiers in Thai area. Fact that battlefield extends across border would have to be an unstated, but evident, presupposition.

(C) Possibility might arise, in light 4 (A) above, that we might also have to make a public apology. If so, and for consistency’s sake, it also should be based on “swirl of battle” concept.

(D) Fact is that Haymaker Battalion will consist of 540 Vietnamese nationals accompanied by only 50 U.S. advisers. Hence, border violation will in essence be Vietnamese, although it is questionable whether GVN would even be aware that this particular MACSOG-controlled group is involved. Nevertheless, if all gory details eke out, it might also become incumbent upon GVN (as in 4 (C) above) to associate itself with any apology. This is one bridge I feel we should cross only when and if we come to it. Otherwise chances of leakage are multiplied. In any event, Tran Van Do would probably feel no qualms about making an apology to his old friend and classmate Souvanna.

5. In general, it is obvious that best hope is to conduct operation without press detection. In case of detection, steadfast “no comment” and “no admission” are best line of defense. If this line is to be breached, request full interchange among Washington, Saigon and Vientiane before any other press line is taken. I do not believe it would be useful to attempt develop a contingency line in advance.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2. In this telegram, April 24, the Department informed the Embassy of the President’s approval of employment of Prairie Fire forces up to battalion size and estimated that the operation on Lao soil would last from 4 to 6 days. The Department then asked the Embassy for specific recommendations, which are described and answered in this cable. (Ibid.)