Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

355. Memorandum From Robert N. Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

Washington, April 22, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Sullivan, the Dove

General Westmoreland, supported by Admiral Sharp, has requested authority to use Prairie Fire forces of up to battalion size if necessary into Base Area 607 in Laos² in conjunction with operations in the Ashau Valley.

Ambassador Sullivan states that he has no authority to concur in this concept and has referred the matter to Washington for decision.

The current operation (Delaware/Lamson 216) does not involve employment of U.S. or ARVN units in Laos. In emergency situations, however, U.S. forces are authorized to act in self-defense against attacks from locations in Laos. Furthermore, Prairie Fire forces of up to three platoons may be used in Laos under current authorities. Past Prairie Fire operations of up to three platoons have been satisfactorily protected from publicity and have not resulted in any major outcry.

Present authorities may be adequate. However, the size and dispersion of enemy units and supplies in this area may require the commitment of Prairie Fire forces larger than three platoons, especially in view of pressures being exerted by U.S. and Vietnamese forces operating in the Ashau Valley.

General Wheeler’s tentative view is that the additional authority does not entail a significant additional risk.³ He should have available by tomorrow a JCS recommendation.⁴

Decision of this issue involves a balancing of the following:

• —military importance of the additional authority;
• —risk of disclosure; and
• —political repercussions if the authority were used and if the operation became public knowledge.

G

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia 5 E (2)b, 1/68–10/68. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2. An attached map, not printed, indicates that Base Area 607 was inside the Laos border mid-way between the boundaries of Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces of South Vietnam.
3. Wheeler made this tentative judgment in an April 22 memorandum to Nitze, the text of which he sent to Westmoreland for comment. (Wheeler to Westmoreland, JCS telegram 04332, April 22; Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Apr-30 Apr, 1968) Westmoreland commented that in view of increased North Vietnamese infiltration, “the use of battalion-size Prairie Fire forces against the enemy’s base areas across the border is another means of applying pressure on the enemy.” (Westmoreland to Wheeler, telegram MAC 05389, April 23; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1499, Laos 000.1—(381 Laos), 1968)
4. In JCSM–258–68, April 22, the Joint Chiefs recommended committing Prairie Fire units of up to a battalion size for operations in Base Area 607 in Laos in conjunction with proposed Operation Delaware. (Ibid.)