Office of the Historian

329. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable1

[document number not declassified]
January 30, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Appraisal of the Lao armed forces defeat at Nam Bac and repercussions from this defeat as of 30 January 1968

ACQ

  • [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
[Page 650]

SOURCE

  • A staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

Summary: The defeat of the Lao Armed Forces (FAR) at Nam Bac has wiped out the government’s effort over a two-year period to link up its first and second military regions in a meaningful manner at the Nam (River) Hou and to expand its influence westward in the direction of Muong Sai and to the northwest to Nam Tha. By eliminating the FAR salient at Nam Bac the enemy has put himself in a better position to harass Luang Prabang and its environs and to disrupt pro-government guerrilla operations into north central Laos. FAR’s defeat at Nam Bac and its subsequent inability to regroup approximately 2,000 men from the Nam Bac salient has robbed FAR of all its reserve force. In addition FAR lost over one million and a quarter American dollars’ worth of equipment.2 Although the military repercussions appear to be more serious than do the political ones there is a movement within the FAR seeking the ouster of Colonel Bounchan, who commanded the ground forces at Nam Bac, and of General Ouane, the commander in chief of the FAR. The defeat at Nam Bac could have been prevented had FAR taken a more aggressive stand against the enemy initially and supplied its men with stronger leadership. End of summary.

[Here follows the body of the cable.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVIII, Cables, 1/68–1/69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Routine.↩
  2. In telegram 109097 to Vientiane, February 2, the Department of State informed the Embassy that “we are distressed at the estimated magnitude of US supplied materiel lost and leave entirely to your judgement how best to convey to appropriate Lao officials our concern over results of this defeat as well as its causes particularly since sizeable portion of lost materiel may have been captured intact and now being used against Lao forces.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)↩