322. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
3326. 1. Although it is too early and difficult to predict the degree of aggressiveness the NVN/PL enemy will manifest this dry season, indications so far are that we shall probably be in for a rather lively time.
2. To the north, immediate pressure on Nam Bac has been relieved but the enemy remain in the area in force and the situation continues to be precarious. There is also a NVN/PL build-up in the vicinity of Site 85. In the south the enemy has made a harassing attack in strength on Lao Ngam during the past two days, withdrawing after inflicting heavy casualties on the friendlies (estimated 42 KIA and 33 WIA) as well as destroying supplies, etc. No US personnel were in Lao Ngam at the time. Also in the south, the enemy continues to build up around Saravane and the Bolovens Plateau. We can probably expect more aggressive enemy activity here and there along the perimeter of friendly held territory in Laos.
3. Our policy and advice to the RLG and FAR has been that the loss of such places as Nam Bac and Lao Ngam would be regrettable but these places should not be defended at all costs. Orderly withdrawal is far preferable to a possible significant military defeat. We believe we can effect our policy through our control of military supplies and our general influence on military matters.
4. Although the FAR has given a fairly good account of itself in the face of enemy pressure at Nam Bac and the FAN similarly at Lao Ngam, experience has shown that when faced with heavy pressure, FAR troops are also capable of panicking. On one such occasion in 1962 (Nam Tha), FAR troops did not stop retreating from the north until they had reached the safety of Thailand across the Mekong. Should FAR troops crack again under pressure, in Nam Bac area or elsewhere, the enemy may well be tempted to press on to more vital objectives. Our estimate is that, with current enemy strength, there is no major threat to vital positions, although the enemy retains the capability of launching attacks to seize temporarily and hold certain positions. We have recently detected, however, through road watch teams in NVN, signs of NVN reinforcements heading towards Laos along Routes 6 and 6 A. The numbers involved are about 3000. For those who are focusing on the war next door this magnitude may seem small; for our little war where friend and foe are evenly matched, the influx of 3000 troops is significant.
[Page 640]5. As the Dept will recall, during November 1965 the NVN/PL came close to taking Thakhek on the Mekong. At that time Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky became quite uneasy that capture of Thakhek would bring US and Thai retaliation. Soviet pressure may have been instrumental in dissuading the DRV from pressing their attack on Thakhek in particular, and the Soviets may also have subsequently discouraged the DRV from launching similar provocative military initiatives in general.
6. I am dining with Kirnassovsky next week, in an effort to forestall NVN attacks, I intend to use that occasion, provided the Dept perceives no objection, to let him know that we know that the NVN are building up, that this build-up continues to violate the Geneva Accords, and that should this build-up threaten the stability of the current political/military situation in Laos, such action would be the cause of grave concern. I would not intend to be drawn out further and would just let him mull it over. Please advise.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Moscow, Saigon, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 86442 to Vientiane, December 19, the Department authorized Hurwitch to make the statement to Kirnassovsky. (Ibid.) In telegram 3385 from Vientiane, December 20, Hurwitch reported that he had done so at an official dinner. Kirnassovsky did not make the usual disclaimers about North Vietnamese troops in Laos, but agreed to look into the matter and give it “serious consideration.” (Ibid.)↩