Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

307. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Saigon, August 13, 1967, 1310Z.

MAC 7617. Subject: Conference with Ambassador Sullivan with respect to Prairie Fire coordination line.

1. Following the Dye Maker discussion,² Sullivan and I met privately to discuss matters of coordination between us. Specifically, I expressed my concern that his staff, based on his guidance, had interpreted the coordination line for Prairie Fire operations to be a barrier that could not be crossed regardless of contingencies. I objected to this interpretation as contrary to sound military practice. Sullivan suggested, and I agreed, that our representatives sit down and trace a new Prairie Fire line to include certain terrain features and roads that naturally fall in the Prairie Fire area. Following this, Sullivan will ask Washington to approve the adjusted line. I put forth the proposition that we should go through our respective channels and urge that the new line be accepted by State and Defense as a coordination line, not a barrier, and we should be delegated authority to coordinate operations across the line on a contingency basis. Sullivan would not agree with this and implied that MACV would take advantage of the situation if such authority were delegated. When I pointed out that he would retain a veto in any given situation, he made the point that he might be succeeded by a weaker individual who might be overwhelmed by the military.

2. It is incomprehensible to me that coordination of operations across a line on a map cannot be delegated to senior officials in the field. Despite Sullivan’s attitude, I recommend that when the new Prairie Fire lines come to State and Defense for approval that Defense urge State to agree to authorize MACV and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate operations on a contingency basis across the line without reference to Washington. Failure to permit this creates delays in reacting to intelligence and, in my view, makes no sense whatsoever. Needless to say, most requests to operate across the coordination line will be from this flank. At the same time, Embassy Vientiane will have veto authority which hopefully would be exercised, not arbitrarily, but in accordance with the best interest of our war efforts.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 July–30 Sept. 1967. Top Secret. Repeated to Wheeler.
2. Sullivan’s account of his and Ambassador Martin’s meeting of August 11 with Generals Westmoreland and Momyer to discuss Dye Marker planning is in telegram 791 from Vientiane, August 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)