Office of the Historian

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, July 6, 1967, 0830Z.

108. Ref: State 909.2

1.
Souvanna agreed this morning to installation of MSQ-77 at Site 85. I assured him that:
a)
All USAF markings would be removed from equipment,
b)
Detonators would be affixed to permit immediate destruction in case of imminent danger,
c)
Personnel would be under civilian cover,
d)
Maximum measures would be taken to camouflage against detection from the air, and
e)
Electronic camouflage would be undertaken by scrambled transmission to relay aircraft over Gulf of Tonkin.
2.
In turn, Souvanna accepted agreed formulation on public relations posture. If there are deniable allegations concerning presence of this installation, he will say “I have no knowledge of such facility in Laos”. If it is blown in undeniable fashion, he will say “I did not know it was there”. In both instances, U.S. can either remain silent or say “no comment.” This should bring all of us angels together on the head of the same pin.
3.
Souvanna also asked whether this radar could function to detect violations of Lao air space. There have been contributing reports of unidentified aircraft in vicinity Plain des Jarres. (Just last evening, we made an abortive effort to intercept a reported Ilyushin 18 near Moung Kheung.) He says he fears these are ChiCom planes used to provide liaison with ChiCom Mission at Kheng Khay. I told him I thought this could probably be worked into installation, but it might degrade our communications security.
4.
Please provide technically sound reply whether MSQ-77 could serve as early warning radar, or, in a pinch, as intercept control.3 If so, would this cause shift from agreed line of sight, scrambled, and relayed emanation pattern.
5.
Assume JCS will now direct 7th AF to make contact with my Air Attaché to get this project moving. Timing and other factors involving sensitivity will be coordinated by this Embassy.
6.
I would like assurances that info on this installation will be held on the closest need-to-know basis, that all personnel who do know will be briefed on need for maximum security and that all efforts will be made to avoid indications of its location on maps, charts, or instructions. If operational strike units can function without actually knowing exact location of MSQ-77, this would clearly obviate possibility that captured air crews could become source of compromising information.
7.
Please advise steps being taken to accomplish objectives of para 6 above. It should be made clear that a compromise might result in a requirement to remove the installation if it, and the RLG, are sufficiently embarrassed.
Sullivan
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 LAOS–US. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and JCS.↩
  2. In telegram 909 to Vientiane, July 4, the Department of State agreed that in the “worst” case of full-blown disclosure of the installation at Site 85, the United States would accept Souvanna’s denial of prior knowledge and in turn remain silent or say “no comment.” (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 3371 to Vientiane, July 8, the Department of State informed Sullivan that the early warning and intercept control capacity of the equipment of MSQ 77 “is so limited as to be of little or no use in detecting violations of Lao airspace.” (Ibid.)↩