Office of the Historian

272. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1

[document number not declassified]
December 30, 1966.

COUNTRY

  • Laos

SUBJECT

  • A Situation Appraisal of the National Assembly Election Campaign as of 30 December 1966

ACQ

  • [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
[Page 542]

SOURCE

  • A staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgement by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary: In the few days before the election campaign closed on 31 December 1966, the role of the military is still dominant although military leaders have never coalesced. Military commanders and their candidates are strongest in military regions one, two and four. In the third and fifth military regions, the election fight is more wide open. This is particularly true in the third military region where Deputy Prime Minister Leuam Insisiengmay is attempting to lead a bloc in open opposition to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. Souvanna has patched together various arrangements with regional leaders and has used General Ouan Rathikoun to influence Military Region One and as his liaison to Military Region Two. Souvanna has worked with Sisouk na Champassak to reach an accommodation with General Phasouk Somly in Region Four and then has attempted to split the political right by making a deal with Phoui and Ngon Sananikone in Vientiane, Borikhane and Khammouane Provinces. His compromises with FAR and the Sananikones have for the time being checked General Kouprasith Abhay and may cut into Leuam’s power. With these shaky agreements and understandings to provide the props, Souvanna’s compromise list of candidates, largely the selections of regional commanders, will probably prevail and a substantial majority in the Assembly will consist of those who have made some sort of a deal with Souvanna; but the new Assembly and elected candidates will have merely formed the framework in which the political struggle in government-controlled Laos will be slugged out. The regional leaders have compromised with local interests and have in several key cases wittingly incorporated anti-Souvanna deputies with leadership potential into their lists, even over Souvanna’s protests. Souvanna has, however, succeeded in eliminating several offensive deputies and the French-backed Neutralist faction in Luang Prabang has largely evaporated. Although the military leaders will probably serve as a braking force on irrational acts of the Assembly, there remains the raw material and sentiment in the Assembly to develop a bloc of political opposition to Souvanna. This will be a rightist movement; and, if it were well led, it could develop into a political organization which eventually could prove a challenge to Souvanna’s leadership.

[Here follows a 13-page report.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67. Confidential.↩