Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

260. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 15, 1965, 4:54 p.m.

66917. Ref: Vientiane 2276.²

1. Share your dismay over possible new disturbance within neutralist ranks and agree direct action to unseat Kong Le would be unfortunate, particularly while Souvanna in U.S.

2. We are arranging to contact Souvanna in New York and inform him along lines of your para 6,³ including offer of communications assistance should he desire. You should also contact Sisoumang in similar vein, since it would be impossible to explain to Souvanna why we credited report sufficiently to alert him without informing designated acting MinDef.

3. Also believe it would be useful to spread knowledge of rumored “coup” somewhat more widely if you can arrange to do so without attribution.

4. If your late reading of situation warrants, including Sisoumang’s reaction, recommend you consider feasibility of delaying Kong Le’s return to Vang Vieng by aircraft “mechanical difficulty” or other means. An alternative would be for ARMA rep to accompany him back to Vang Vieng which should disrupt plan at least to some degree, unless you feel this would betray knowledge of plot.

5. Source of FOV 9469⁴ is such that we are concerned report may have been launched to test U.S. reaction, and caution obviously called for. Agree it is important to avoid appearance of taking sides (though it is somewhat difficult to see clearly who is on whose side). Though fully cognizant of Neutralist commanders’ grievances toward Kong Le over money, faltering leadership, etc. and of their desire to improve future career prospects, we have not been aware of breach in close personal tie between Col. Sing and Kong Le that would permit former to consider participation in plot that might involve his leader’s death.

6. We continue to believe a reasonable long-range goal is to work for orderly reincorporation of Neutralist forces into National forces, at pace and in ways that will remove rivalry and mutual suspicions, offer security for future of able officers and troops, and preserve Neutralist label at least for time being. Disappearance of distinctive Neutralist units, however reorganized and subordinated to National command, would, we think have general political disadvantage and might lead to further defections toward Deuane or PL from among those who have followed Kong Le so long in pursuit of principle of neutrality.

7. Recognize that if Kong Le has come to be serious and unmanageable impediment to progress in this direction, we cannot indefinitely prop him up in place despite his apparently constructive interest in socio-economic development of Vang Vieng area. Unable judge from here to what extent his retention as Commander is still of symbolic importance to civilians in Neutralist areas and to line troops, as distinct from disillusioned staff and selfseeking unit commanders. But forcible removal of once popular if now tarnished leader (especially by violence and with FAR connivance), under circumstances reminiscent of departure of Siho and other such incidents, would clearly be disruptive and increase sense of personal insecurity among Lao to which you have recently referred. Without implying we would step in to stop contemplated action, your conversations dealing with reported move against Kong Le should make clear we not endorsing any such attempt to solve a basic political problem by force.⁵

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Hamilton and cleared with Unger and in substance with Holland of OSD/ISA.
2. In telegram 2276 from Vientiane, October 15, the Embassy reported that officers commanding the majority of the neutralist forces had connived with rightist FAR military officers to arrest Kong Le and integrate neutralist forces into FAR. The conspiring officers would receive command of mobile groups and all cooperating neutralist forces would retain their present ranks. (Ibid.)
3. The Embassy suggested in paragraph 6 that Souvanna be apprised of the threat in general terms without the specifics of the conspiracy. (Ibid.)
4. Not further identified.
5. On October 17 Kong Le left Vang Vieng for Thailand believing that he was on an official mission. When he arrived in Bangkok he discovered that he had been deceived by his subordinates into exile. (Airgram A–108 from Vientiane, November 18; Department of State, Central Files, POL 6 LAOS)