Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

252. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Saigon, September 16, 1966, 0519Z.

160519Z. Personal for Adm Sharp, info Gen Wheeler, from Gen Westmoreland. Subj: COMUSMACV SLAM concept (U). Ref: COMUSMACV 160518 Z Sep.²

1. Reference reported on conference between Amb Sullivan, Amb Martin and myself. This message outlines MACV “SLAM” concept referred to in reference.

2. With arrival of northeast monsoon season, weather in Laotian Panhandle will be clearing and enemy is expected to infiltrate personnel and supporting material in quantity through that area. The requirement to counter this threat is evident. If allowed to go unchecked, it will permit enemy to engage our flank in Quang Tri Province from the west and will permit large scale diversionary attacks further south.

3. The seriousness of this thrust led us to development of a new concept to block, deny, spoil, and disrupt the infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies through Laos during the forthcoming dry season. During the previous dry season we were experimenting, developing tactics and techniques, and building up our assets. Capitalizing on our experience and improvement of resources, we now have developed a concept of operations for the forthcoming period of good weather which I believe will improve significantly our ability to counter the infiltration threat through the Laotian Panhandle. The concept hinges on two basic principles:

A. First, we will intensify around-the-clock surveillance and interdiction of known infiltration routes. This process will stress attack of selected interdiction points (SIPs) as well as strikes against targets of opportunity.

B. Second, we will concentrate our resources on successive key target areas to be known as “SLAMs.”

4. Highlights of our concept, which consists in turn of a series of overlapping phases, are as follows:

A. Phase One. All intelligence collection agencies (all-sensor air reconnaissance, road watcher, FAC’s, Shining Brass, etc.) will intensify their efforts. Our goal in this phase is to refine our knowledge of enemy capabilities to infiltrate through Laos and to obtain indications as to what and where he will put his major efforts. During this collection phase, we will continue normal Tiger Hound strikes and other actions at approximately current rates. In essence, during the pre-northeast monsoon season, we will continue pressure with Tally Ho interdiction in route package one, keeping a sharp eye on Steel Tiger.

B. Phase Two. As our intelligence base expands, we will effect transition from phase one into phase two. Current reconnaissance and offensive operations throughout the Panhandle will be continued, with priority to enemy buildup capabilities, i.e., engineer and other construction efforts, way stations, supply points, and staging areas. Concentrated intelligence on these potential target areas will provide required data for selection of key target areas.

C. Phase Three. Once an area is designated as a “SLAM,” we will hit the target with sufficient B–52 and tactical airstrikes to neutralize it. This action will be followed by visual and photo air reconnaissance and/or ground reconnaissance patrols and, if appropriate, exploitation forces. During the stage involving ground forces, the only application of air power will be in direct support of Shining Brass. Latter elements, on withdrawal, will leave mines and booby traps; Air Force will follow with air-delivered land mines. In special instances, we plan to leave “stay behind” reconnaissance parties. Dependent upon the area and intelligence, the sequence of applying these resources will be altered. This process will be repeated against each developed target. It is essential in this regard, to understand that massing our efforts on a specific “SLAM” area does not mean ignoring other targets. FAC’s and armed reconnaissance aircraft will be scouring the roads; road watchers and Shining Brass will operate in their territories; and our other intelligence operations will continue.

D. During all phases, there will be an intensification of psychological warfare and herbicide operations.

5. In summary, the enemy capability to infiltrate personnel and supporting material through the Laotian Panhandle is a definite threat to our efforts in SVN. We must use all assets at our disposal to block, deny, spoil and disrupt this infiltration.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. 58, Cables, 9/1–18/66. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Exclusive. Repeated to the JCS for Wheeler.
2. Document 251.