Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

246. Report by the Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, August 16, 1966.

[Here follows a report of Colby’s trip to South Vietnam.]

Laos

8. As noted in the cable sent to you (copy attached),² I found the situation in Laos exhilarating. This is not only true of Northern Laos, which my cable discussed, but also of the situation in the South. The bases at Pakse and Savannakhet are vigorously targeted at the principal objective in the area, the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and are pressing operations there with courage, energy and a high degree of professionalism. Most heartening was the contrast between this visit in July and my visit to Laos in October 1965. At that time, Pathet Lao guerrillas were at large in the neighborhood of the city and indeed in January 1966 attacked a radio relay post on the hill overlooking the city, the key Plateau of Bolovens was an inviting and vulnerable target for Pathet Lao seizure and the FAR was torn between trying to defend against at least three PL/VC threats near Saravane, Attopeu and Pak Song. In July 1966, an extensive net of local security forces exists on the Plateau except for a small area of residual Pathet Lao presence being encircled and gradually eliminated. The area near Saravane has been subjected to a most impressive exercise in “oil spotting” so that the road is now open between there and Pakse, protected by village security forces and Special Guerrilla Units. Both Lao and USAF aircraft are finding remunerative targets. In contrast to the situation in Laos in October of 1965, these areas are being used as jump off points for road watch and harassment teams moving east of the Sekong River into the Ho Chi Minh Trail area. One limitation on these operations is the availability of adequate armored helicopter support, which we will be trying to increase. Our side in Laos has the initiative and is looking around for additional work to do.

9. The most important point of a review of the Lao situation is the clear effect of a smoothly working country team under a forceful Ambassador and the strength that results from patient adherence to a balanced program of building popular participation in local security forces, guerrilla units for reinforcement and regular forces for contesting the main forces of the enemy, with full use of closely coordinated air support. Since this is a direct development of the President’s action plan for Laos initiated in July 1963,³ it is reasonable to expect that a balanced program such as this, prosecuted consistently over a several year period, can be relied upon elsewhere not only to hold off Communist encroachment, but to press it backwards.

10. This Station will probably need small additions to its strength levels to enable it to carry on these programs, plus a variety of opportunities which present themselves in Vientiane for coverage of North Vietnam [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The basic approach, however, of small scale U.S. and unobtrusive (except to the enemy) efforts will be maintained and will be afforded henceforth the same priority for calls on Headquarters support as that accorded the Vietnam operation directly. We shall also begin the process of developing the cloak, and later the reality, of legality of the paramilitary forces supported in Laos, so that this support may with all deliberate speed be shifted to more regular channels and the programs not be jeopardized by political difficulties in quieter times.

[Here follow a report of Colby’s trip to Thailand, Indonesia, and a very brief general assessment.]

1. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Far East General. Secret.
2. The attached telegram from Colby at Udorn, July 28, described the North Vietnamese buildup and offensive in north Laos against Meo (Hmong) units that began in November 1965. Meo units fought a series of bitter actions as they retreated. In April 1966 the USAF began jet sorties against the North Vietnamese in close collaboration with Vang Pao and the Meo. Colby noted that “the marriage of excellent intelligence furnished by CAS and the superb performance by the 7th AF has enabled outnumbered friendly units to not only contain the enemy offensive, but to mount a counteroffensive which has regained 90% of the area lost.”
3. For documentation on the plan, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, pp. 1019–1043.