Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

232. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hamilton) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)¹

I–22975

Washington, May 4, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Prospective Command Change in the RLAF

As I mentioned in a recent conversation, I have been disturbed by the conjunction of (1) renewed requests for hospitalization (for hernia) and an invitational tour in the US for RLAF BGen. Thao Ma with (2) renewed efforts on the part of Gen. Ouan Rathikoun to have Gen. Ma removed from his command and replaced, apparently, by BGen. Sourith Don Sasorith. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma is reportedly sympathetic to this plan. (Key references are EmbTel 1110, TDCS–314/05276–66 and AIRA 00726 Apr 66.)²

We of course support provision of hospital care for Gen. Ma when required. USAF has confirmed that he can be accommodated at Tripler or Clark upon his request as well as that the invitation to visit the US is open-ended and that arrangements can be made on 60–90 days notice (CSAF AFNICB 86238 Apr 66).³

Ambassador Sullivan has reported his opposition to having the US “used” (by the offer of trips) to cover Gen. Ma’s removal from RLAF command, and Souvanna has agreed that Gen. Ma would “still be in charge” of the RLAF “when he returned”. This may not go far enough. Based on present knowledge, it seems to me that we should urge Ambassador Sullivan to seek to persuade Souvanna and Ouan not to relieve Gen. Ma, before or after his return from travel to the US. My own judgment is that this is a matter of considerable importance to US and even to RLG military and political interests, but this memorandum is intended only to supplement our brief conversation as you suggested and does not advance a DOD position.

On the military side, I do not believe that a ground force commander should assume command of the RLAF or that Gen. Sourith is the one to try it if it were a good idea. Some notes on the personalities involved are attached. Whatever misgivings some RLAF officers have at present about Gen. Ma’s leadership, the imposition of a traditional Lao ground commander on the spirited T–28 jockeys of the RLAF would be a sure step toward diminished morale and military effectiveness. Numerous activities of the US seem to depend on the RLAF remaining sufficiently operational to justify MAP support and the other assistance we have provided to it. We should not run the risk of upsetting a working arrangement, if we can help Souvanna avoid it, unless there are compelling collateral advantages. I do not see any, except that the change would help Gen. Ouan and the Sananikones to consolidate their control of the FAR. Whether this is desirable is more a political than a military judgment.

Because the desire to remove Ma is of long standing, I find it hard not to believe that it fits into a pattern of Sananikone actions against Phoumi and Khamkhong and of inaction vis-à-vis Vang Pao and Kong Le that seem to me to account in part for recent and cumulative severe reverses in the northeast. If Ma goes, Gen. Phasouk Somly may well be next on the list. The Sananikones will then be able to concentrate single-mindedly on management of the central Mekong valley area that appears to be about as far as their strategic vision extends. I doubt that their interest in effective control would long be limited to the military sphere without taking on a political character, raising questions about the stability of the RLG.

There is no assurance that a restatement of our confidence in Ma will save him from the rockpile. And the best course of action in Laos usually seems to be to let the Lao go their own way, at least after obligating them to consider all aspects of a contemplated decision. This does seem one instance, however, when in the US interest some representations should be made

William C. Hamilton

⁴

Attachment

GEN. THAO MA AND GEN. SOURITH DON SASORITH

It has been consistently reported by all appropriate American observers since mid-1963 (when the RLAF went “operational”) that among the Lao it is Gen. Ma and he alone who makes the RLAF go. He has significant known weaknesses (fits of temper, inability to organize a staff or delegate work or authority, excessive concentration on one idea at a time, etc), and it is not to his credit that there is no RLAF officer in sight to take his place in the event of either a combat or a political accident: Nevertheless, we must deal with the situation as it is, and it is hard to escape the conclusion that Ma remains of central importance to the RLAF and to the US.

A desire to unseat Gen. Ma, because he is too “independent” of Vientiane, has been expressed by Gen. Kouprasith and other General Staff sources off and on for some time. The revival of the idea appears to have followed a recent visit to Gen. Ouan by the RLAF Chief of Staff, Col. Ou Neua. Although there is unquestionably some basis for various charges leveled by him against Ma, I am sure you will recall Ou Neua as one of the least reliable, most fractious officers we had to deal with (notably as Wattay airport commandant in 1962–3). He has been in and out of the neutralist forces and various right-wing alignments and is known to be jealous of Ma’s commanding stature as RLAF chief. It is unfortunate that his testimony (alone, as far as we are informed) enabled Ouan to persuade Souvanna that perhaps it is time to move Ma up and out of the way.

One of the charges brought by Ou Neua, for example, is that Ma is “fixed” on T–28 operations and neglects the transport squadron. Probably there is some truth in this, but part of the translation may be that Ma has cracked down on the use of RLAF C–47s for the transportation of relatives, cattle, and opium.

As to Gen. Sourith, I have tapped the recollections of Col. William Law and Lt. Col. Gibert Grout to fill out my own limited knowledge. (Col. Grout has known him since 1958 and was the principal point of contact with him during our period in Laos.) Sourith has certain technical qualifications:

a. is a French-trained pilot (but is not known to have qualified except in liaison aircraft);

b. about 1958, he served as FAR Chief of Army Aviation (but at that time it was a ground-oriented command consisting of the paratroops and enough aircraft to move them, occasionally);

c. he is presently attending the C&GSC at Fort Leavenworth, and is reported to be cooperative, popular with fellow students, and a “fair student” with some language problem.

This appears to be about the extent of his military qualifications for the RLAF command.

Sourith began his service in the French Army, where at one time he was sergeant-aide to a recent French Assistant Military Attaché (well known to you) who described his talents as having been fully exploited in the aide capacity. He was directly involved in the 1962 Nam Tha episode, making a record no better—though no worse—than the other commanders concerned. After 1962, he remained as CG, MR I, keeping himself aloof from Vientiane and the General Staff. He was regarded by Gen. Phoumi as a “cipher,” though undoubtedly in part because he was not responsive to Phoumi’s interests. Col. Grout believes that he was sincerely devoted to helping build the reputations of the King and Crown Prince out in the villages, distinguishing himself more for a willingness to bat around in the countryside than for the military activities that accompanied this commendable stress on “nation-building”. He was dragged reluctantly into Operation Triangle but, according to Col. Law, did well once he got his battalions under way. He has long seemed content to hold onto his fief in MR I in collaboration with Gen. Norasing in MR VI.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648. Laos 000.1 (200.2 Laos). Secret. Sent through Admiral Blouin. Copies were sent to Truehart, Barbis, Colonel Mobley, and the Air Force Foreign Liaison Branch.
2. None of the references has been found.
3. Not found.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Hamilton signed the original.