221. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Embassy in the Philippines1
Vientiane, February 20, 1966,
0610Z.
58. For Harriman from Sullivan. Reurtel 18 from Canberra.2
- 1.
- In general, enemy military activity throughout Laos continues about normal for this time of year. As you know, period February through April has traditionally been their season of major offensives, which then terminate just before rainy season sets in. There have been the usual spate of rumors (assiduously cultivated by the French) that this year they will open a major drive into the Mekong Valley and, of course, they theoretically maintain capability to do this if they choose. But we see no extraordinary evidence to suggest that they so intend, nor would we see any particular logic in their making such an effort this year. Having said this, I would point out that the lines of communication with North Vietnam are short and Hanoi’s logic is not always susceptible to rational determination.
- 2.
- The major military event which has occurred since departure VP party has been a two (or perhaps three) battalion attack by North Vietnamese units against Nakhang (Site 36) in Sam Neua Province. These troops came up by forced march from Ban Ban on Route Seven for this deliberate purpose. Although the objective (Nakhang) is worthwhile in itself, the force deployed seems probably inadequate to capture and hold the site against counterattack by RLG forces. Therefore, this action has the earmarks of a politically inspired operation. They have chosen an area of significance to RLG and ourselves (which we use as forward base for air rescue helicopter units) and have attacked units which have a special status for us because they are under command of Vang Pao. By good luck, they even managed to wound Vang Pao slightly in the action, causing his medical evacuation.
- 3.
- I do not interpret this attack as a reaction to VP visit, but rather as a direct reaction to Kong Le’s loudly heralded but rather feebly executed attack on Phou Kout. As you know, the Neutralists have been attempting to take Phou Kout on and off for two years and Souvanna personally encourages them in this effort. On this occasion, the Neutralists’ effort was widely publicized (again with French connivance) and has provoked PL promises of retaliation. I presume Nakhang action falls in that category.
- 4.
- However, unless North Vietnamese are prepared pump a few more battalions into this sector, I would expect attacking force would [Page 444] gradually retire under pressure RLG reinforcements now being brought to the scene.
- 5.
- As far as action in other sectors concerned, there is not much new. Rumors persist of large enemy units moving towards Bolovens Plateau in south, but none have yet been located. General Phasouk is conducting search operations in area and one clear and hold operation without encountering major resistance. However, I do not discount something happening here because I think Communists actually believe US intends occupy the area and they may wish activate some spoiling operations.
- 6.
- In far north, there is pressure on the Nam Ou Valley. North Vietnamese used bombing pause to build up supplies at Dien Bien Phu, which lies at head of Nam Ou Valley. A serious thrust down this valley could endanger Luang Prabang, but it seems doubtful either Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese forces in area are adequate for this purpose.
- 7.
- Finally, at Thathom in central Laos, there is an opportunity for enemy exploitation because of weakness and demoralization of defending forces. These are remnants of old Phoumi units and have no desire to fight under current leadership. They are being rotated out and should be replaced in time to plug current weaknesses there.
- 8.
- In general, I feel that any major enemy drives would have to involve concentration of forces, which would then become vulnerable to air attack. I believe our air resources are good enough to handle pretty much of what we can foresee. Therefore, since the enemy is aware of this, I would expect them to use their next two months for their annual nibbling operation, during the course of which we will lose some terrain.
- 9.
- During the monsoon season, we would expect to get back what we lose in these two months and therefore, on balance, would expect the ground situation in Laos to stay just about the way it has been over the last couple of years.
Sullivan