Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 3, 1966.

703. For Bundy.

1. Since I seem to sense increasing pressures on you from various quarters to do something dramatic against Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, I think it may be useful to provide you with more detailed information concerning action already in progress so that you can help whip some of these pressures into perspective.

2. As far as aerial operations are concerned, you should know that MACV has set up a special sub/command of Second Air Division, called Tiger Hound, which specifically concerns itself with infiltration route. (I would add parenthetically that this organ was established at my suggestion.)

3. Tiger Hound has a mission and an authority which essentially permits it to devastate all eastern reaches of Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, and to intercept all traffic before it gets to south Viet Nam. This is accomplished as follows:

A. We have drawn a line from Laos, Cambodian, SVN tri-border point at YB 7535 to point on Lao-SVN border approximately XD 9020. In the area east of this line, Tiger Hound operates O–1 observer and spotter aircraft with U.S. airborne FAC’s, just as they do in-country. Additionally, there is an Airborne Command Post C–130, with two RLAF officers aboard, and instantaneous communications with Savannakhet and Vientiane.

B. Tiger Hound has been running from 100–200 sorties daily in this area since early December. My impression is that this is a far more intense sortie rate than any similar area in SVN or than any comparable area in DRV. There is, in short, no limitation upon ability our air power strike this region except limitations they impose upon sortie rate.

C. I might add that it had been my intention augment this ability by recommending gradual extension B–52 raids to same area, but believe Air Force may have jeopardized their own future here by inability keep their prowess from the press.

D. Although it will be noted that the area given to our military to strike covers the essential zone contiguous to SVN, I have not precluded possibility that zone may be somewhat further extended once operations in current area are perfected. In my judgment, they are far from perfected as yet and could stand a great deal of internal improvement on the U.S. side. Therefore, until there is evidence that our people are really doing their job well in this given area, I see no benefit to the home team in giving them more to try to digest than they already have on their plate.

4. One other problem which probably is regularly dished up to you is Shining Brass. I find the role I have to play in this exercise particularly galling. This is essentially an Eagle Scout program devised by some extremely well motivated and brave young men. However, except for Max Taylor, nobody in the U.S. military establishment has ever seemed willing to tell them that the program is not militarily worth the price. The net result is that all our military hierarchy stands aside and lets me shoot down these schemes which responsible senior military men should never permit to come to my attention.

5. This matter reached the height of absurdity last week when I was sent photos of an area which Shining Brass wished to reconnoiter in order to establish its military nature. It was clear to me from the photos that the area was military and so I validated it forthwith as an air strike target. The air strikes were carried out and secondary explosions resulted. The target will be recycled as required.

6. Imagine my surprise when I got a complaint from the Shining Brass people that I had given their target to the Air Force. This supposedly would have been their objective in any event, so I can only assume I deprived them of brownie points.

7. You will see from foregoing that, if our air program develops properly, there should also develop an incompatibility between Tiger Hound and Shining Brass. We cannot saturate an area with air attacks and still open it up for foot soldiers to patrol through. I trust, therefore, you will be able hold this one also in perspective.

8. I am meeting again with Westy January 5 on all these matters.² Any thoughts you may have for that meeting should reach me prior close of business January 4 Vientiane time. Don’t give up the ship.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis; Privacy Channel. No time of transmittal appears on the source text, but it was received at the Department of State at 1:29 a.m., January 3.
2. Telegram 715 from Vientiane, January 5, contains a brief summary of the meeting among Sullivan, Martin, Westmoreland, and Moore at Udorn on January 5. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS) Westmoreland provides a more detailed account, noting that he “finally accused him [Sullivan] of ‘fiddling while Rome burned,’” when Sullivan refused to remove the restraining line for Tiger Hound. In addition, Sullivan insisted that expansion of the Shining Brass program required authorization from Washington. (Memorandum for the record by Westmoreland, January 11; Johnson Library, Westmoreland Papers, History File, #3 20 Dec 65–29 Jan 66)