211. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
651. 1. I have spent most of my recent vacation worrying about the Ho Chi Minh Trail. What concerns me is the prospect that any kind of direct attack we may be able to mount against this skein of roads, paths, rivers, streams and tunnels will fail in the ultimate necessity of interdiction. Our air action currently harasses the routes and, as we perfect our techniques, will make that harassment more severe. However, we all conceded it cannot interdict. Shining Brass, even if stepped up to air borne command proportions, could at best spasmodically harass. Even the much discussed Route 9 invasion, either from Thailand or from Vietnam, or both, would do nothing more than spread a thin picket of men along horrendous terrain, and expose them in any one location to the bloodletting of concentrated enemy attacks at places and times of the enemy’s choosing. None will assure interdiction.
2. As all our intelligence indicators suggest, we must, in the near future, expect the movement of DRV regular forces, perhaps in divisional strength, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. We must also expect the current [Page 425] rather limited logistics operation to expand to proportions more nearly comparable with the trail’s capabilities. We should therefore be searching to achieve maximum interdiction if we are to have any hope of approaching isolation of the highlands battlefield in South Vietnam.
3. General Westmoreland has told me of his proposals re increased US forces for Vietnam. I assume these are favorably under consideration in Washington now. We must assume, as stated above, that their development will attract more DRV regulars and that the fighting will assume ever greater conventional characteristics. So long as we are unable to stem the flow through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, I wonder where we believe this constant reciprocal escalation of manpower will lead US.
4. My assumption is that Peking hopes it would lead us into two actions which would have significantly deleterious political consequences for the US. The first of these would be the bombing of population centers in North Vietnam, which would achieve very little militarily, but which would earn us all sorts of opprobrium in the Afro-Asian world and would play clearly into Peking’s racist propaganda, thus enabling them to pursue their efforts to isolate US diplomatically among non-white nations. It would also, of course, cause all sorts of trouble domestically for the administration. The second action would be the aforementioned Route 9 operation, which would also achieve much less than is desirable militarily, but which would constitute a direct provocation to the Soviets in Laos, bring Thailand irretrievably into the war and generally follow the ChiCom desire to spread the conflict geographically away from its concentration on North Vietnam, thus diffusing the issues, increasing the opportunities for confusion, and complicating our problems, both militarily and politically.
5. Before we start down these rocky roads, and while Washington is presumably considering the deployment and commitment of considerable number of troops, I would like to suggest an alternative mission for these troops. At first blush, this proposal may appear radical or even rash; but, balanced against the considerations adduced above, I am convinced it would not only be more effective but actually more conservative. My proposal is that we mount an amphibious invasion of North Vietnam in the region of Vinh and that we cut the country in two at the narrow waist which is not only the most defensible point, but where interdiction of infiltration could genuinely be achieved.
6. This is not a new or an original suggestion. I recall first being briefed on the Vinh concept by General Lemnitzer in Secretary McNamara’s office in 1962. At that time, the number of troops involved seemed all out of proportion to the problem we faced in Vietnam. Moreover, the political consequences appeared to be so formidable that no one chose even to examine the obvious military advantages seriously. Now, of course, the troop numbers are very much within the framework of our [Page 426] current consideration. Moreover (and this is what I believe is new) I would further submit that the political consequences of this proposal would be less drastic than that which would eventually flow from apparently less radical measures.
7. The major question, of course and as always, would be the ChiCom reaction. When I was in Hong Kong earlier this week. I threw the question hypothetically to our senior China experts at the Consulate General and got a curiously mixed measure of replies. Although more thought this would trigger ChiCom military intervention than thought otherwise, there were those who argued with much cogency that ChiCom policy would still be to fight only to the last North Vietnamese.2 Needless to say, they will continue to study and discuss the issue.
8. To my mind, the ChiCom risk is more or less a constant, which we are obviously, no matter what our course, going to have to approach more closely in any event before we finish this business. The variables have more to do and the choices more clearly lie (it seems to me) in the realm of effectiveness of alternatives open to us and the constant efforts to pinpoint, isolate, and concentrate on the immediate source of decision in Hanoi.
9. One further element that appeals to me about the Vinh proposal is the asset we would gain for bargaining in any political settlement. We have earlier expected that, at any conference table, our bombing raids would be the political equivalent of VC terror in the South. They may yet be, but we now (for “conference” proposes) need a political equivalent of infiltration. By seizing and holding a piece of DRV territory, by emphasizing that we are doing it in order to throttle infiltration, and by making clear that we are willing to give it back when the eventual guaranteed political settlement is reached, we would have our equivalent—in spades.
10. I could go on and argue this case for several more paragraphs but feel I must have essentially made my point clear by now. Hence, I will stop here. However, I am stopping only to elicit a response. If, as I hope, others in Washington have already laid this issue out [for?]discussion, I shall rest easy. If no such discussion is underway, I would like to open it by a further, more detailed brief. Please let me have reaction soonest.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 1179 from Hong Kong, May 21, Rice reported that although his staff had mixed opinions as to the Chinese reaction to U.S. ground operations against North Vietnam or Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the officers working most closely on mainland China were of the opinion that the Chinese would react militarily. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 686 from Vientiane, December 27, Sullivan complained that he had no reaction to his proposal as outlined above. Sullivan added that he believed he was not “in the picture as far as current military planning is concerned.” (Ibid.)↩