Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

206. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Barbis) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)¹

Washington, November 23, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Laos—Use of Napalm

The following is submitted in response to your request:

1. Present Guidance—You will recall that the question of possible use of napalm first came up in June 1964 in connection with Phou Kout. The basic decision on the use of napalm in Laos, which is still in effect, is contained in Deptel 1269 of June 29, 1964, Exdis.² This joint State/Defense message granted authority for the use of napalm in Laos by T–28’s whenever Prime Minister Souvanna, with the Ambassador’s consent, desired its use on military targets. You were cautioned in this message to stress to Souvanna the necessity of avoiding attacks with napalm even on military targets which are in close proximity to areas inhabited by civilians.

2. You may also recall that this authority was never implemented because of British concern over this proposed use of napalm in support of the operations against Phou Kout. The British concern was based at the time on the possible effect this action would have on the Polish proposal for limited discussions on Laos. In informing Vientiane of these British views and our decision not to use napalm at that time at Phou Kout, we qualified the basic authority given in Deptel 1269 to prohibit the use of napalm without the prior authority of Washington, except in a situation which the Ambassador considered to be an emergency or a situation in which particular offensive or defensive military action already undertaken would otherwise fail. Souvanna’s concurrence, of course, continued to be required.

3. Comments—Ambassador Sullivan in his telegram³ has put his finger on the main arguments for continuing our policy not to use napalm in Laos, except what the RLAF can do under specific conditions described under 2 above. These arguments are, of course, first, the question of escalation and international reaction to it and, second, whether it would be possible to hold the line publicly, as Souvanna insists, on any comment as a result of pressures for information on the subject. It seems to me that Ambassador Sullivan should be able to take the heat in the local kitchen much more easily than he or we would be in a position to take the heat from press queries and pressures, not to speak of our allies and the Soviets. Despite all that we have done or are doing in Laos, because of our restraint and the judicious application of necessary actions to preserve the independence of Laos and hurt North Vietnamese infiltration through Laos as much as we can, we are nevertheless still in fairly strong international position. I have the fear that with the intensification of our air operations and with the authorization to use defoliants as two examples, to go this one step further and to authorize the use of napalm by both US and RLAF aircraft will very soon put us on the road to destroying the good position we and the RLG are in. Moreover, it does not seem to me that the level of PL activity is such that the use of napalm is critical (e.g., white phosphorus seems to be meeting immediate tactical requirements adequately). The use of napalm in US air operations against infiltration also seems to me to be unnecessary at this stage and would bring with it, should it be authorized, a whole series of problems resulting from possible mistakes in hitting the right target and the like (e.g., can you imagine what the reaction would have been had napalm been used against the FAR trucks west of Muong Phalane, or in the mistake made in hitting BV–33?).

4. I hope we can continue to exercise the restraint which has really been our strength in Laos in dealing with Souvanna’s pressures for the use of napalm.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, EA/Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia Files: Lot 75 D 394. Top Secret.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27–10 LAOS)
3. Document 205.
4. In telegram 329 to Vientiane, November 24, the Department of State informed Sullivan that it would continue to adhere to the present guidance on the use of napalm in Laos: napalm should be used by RLAF against military targets only with expressed authority from Washington, except in a situation Sullivan considered an emergency or a situation in which a particular military offensive or defensive action already undertaken would fail without the use of it. In all such cases, Souvanna would have to concur. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)