Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

168. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 26, 1965, 4 p.m.

1365. During recent SEACOORD meeting,² General Westmoreland showed me copy of message he had sent JCS February 13³ recommending coordinated package of operations against DRV. In this message, he suggested that Rolling Thunder, 34–A, Barrel Roll and Yankee Team operations be consolidated into single program.

While I fully sympathize with General Westmoreland’s desire have orchestrated operations in DRV to include armed route reconnaissance and low/medium level photography, I wish enter note of caution insofar as his proposal may be interpreted as desire extend current Barrel Roll and Yankee Team operations from Laos into DRV. I have discussed this matter with General Westmoreland and have advised him of my intention write this message. I think he and I are in agreement on this subject but do not presume speak for him in this message. He will doubtless wish comment separately.

Problem in brief is as follows: Laos, unlike South Vietnam, is incapable protecting itself against ground action by DRV and does not have US commitment assure such protection. It therefore becomes highly important to Souvanna to be able to state that his territory and air space are not being used for actions against DRV. If he can maintain this posture, he believes he will have continuing general support from Soviet Union and its support will provide check against overt DRV incursions into Laos. Fragile as this belief may be, we must accept it as basic element Souvanna’s outlook and respect it if we are to expect his continued cooperation in other enterprises this area.

He has no objection to massive US punishment of DRV within DRV itself. He has no objection to clandestine US punishment of DRV and Pathet Lao within Laos. However, he strictly insists two must be kept separate so that he can maintain aforementioned sophistry of innocence in his international dealings, particularly with Soviets. This is a very tricky balance, but one which I think we can respect with a little extra effort on our part.

To maintain this respect, I would therefore take exception to concept of extending Barrel Roll and Yankee Team into DRV. These two programs were developed for operations exclusively in Laos, and I believe tricky nature our operations require them to stay (however artificially) in that same compartment. If armed recce and low/medium level photography programs established for DRV, I believe they should be separate from Lao programs and not ignore international boundary between Laos and DRV.

Partly because of need preserve this artificial distinction as well as because of material advantages to be gained, I have welcomed PACAF proposals establish Yankee Team out of Udorn. It seems to me that this small group of aircraft and pilots, operating exclusively over Laos, will develop special skills which will materially improve the quality of intelligence we accumulate here.

The thought arises, although I will not advance it here, that there might be some prospect for compartmentalizing and specializing Barrel Roll in this same manner. Especially as Rolling Thunder program gains momentum and occupies both Second Air Divison and Fleet air assets, it may be of some value to designate some separate unit, to be based in Thailand, for specific purpose conducting our relatively modest Barrel Roll program. As layman, I have been impressed with capabilities of A–1–H aircraft in Barrel Roll operations, and particularly with their ability (relative to jets) to absorb anti-aircraft damage. This factor is of significant concern to us in connection with our SAR responsibilities, which we take very seriously. I won’t ask in this message whether there would be an A–1–H equipped marine air unit available for such duty, since I feel this would be unwarranted intrusion into the very complex problem of US air dispositions in this overall theater, something well beyond our perspective as we peer out from the jungle canopy of Laos. However, from our very limited perspective, such a disposition would have its attractions.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, sent with instructions that the Department pass a copy to the JCS and Saigon a copy to MACV.
2. Reference is to the SEACOORD meeting of February 22–23, reports of which are in telegram 2771 from Saigon, February 23, and telegram 1347 from Vientiane, February 23. (Both ibid.)
3. Not found.