161. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Communist Buildup in Southern Laos May Be Precautionary
The Communist troop and supply buildup in the Laotian corridor since December has raised the possibility that Hanoi intends to initiate a major new offensive in Laos or to introduce regular North Vietnamese army units into South Vietnam. However, the relatively cautious Communist propaganda approach to Laos and the absence (despite Binh Gia)2 of any firm indication of a shift from guerrilla to conventional warfare in South Vietnam argue against the conclusion that these are now Communist intentions. The events preceding the buildup and the evidence we have of its nature point more convincingly to the conclusion that the buildup represents a determined effort to shore up and maintain the security of the infiltration routes to South Vietnam.
Communist Setbacks in the Corridor. Since October, RLAF T–28’s and Yankee Team aircraft have conducted an intensive air reconnaissance and interdiction program against known and suspected infiltration-related targets. The extent of damage inflicted by air operations is unknown. However, photography confirms that many former military areas are now deserted and nearly all road movements take place at night. Since November, FAR units—largely through superior artillery and close air support—have completed Phase II of Operation Victorious Arrow,3 advancing some 10 miles on a 15 mile front along Route 9 and capturing several former Pathet Lao strong points. In addition, four to five Meo intelligence/harassment teams have infiltrated deep into Communist-held territory and at least one has clashed with Communist forces.
Compared with the degree of control previously exercised by the Communists over this area, therefore, developments since the end of the rainy season have represented a serious deterioration. The Communists undoubtedly know that Phase III of Victorious Arrow envisages an [Page 324] attempt to capture Muong Phine; they may also interpret the press speculation following Ambassador Taylor’s December visit to Washington and the subsequent US jet strikes as a prelude to a ground movement against access routes to South Vietnam. In any event, there is ample cause for Communist concern over existing and possible future deterioration of their security in the corridor.
The Communist Response. Since December, road watch teams have reported artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, heavy convoys and a possible total of 2,000 North Vietnamese troops, moving west and south in the Panhandle. Aerial photography has confirmed the arrival of possibly two new anti-aircraft battalions in the same area during the same period. These battalions alone, accompanied by security forces, support elements, and ammunition, could account for a major portion of the reported troop and supply movements. The remainder may have been introduced to cope with FAR/Meo ground action and to provide the manpower for a sharp counter-attack against operation Victorious Arrow. In December 1963, for example, the FAR advance on Kham Keut and Lak Sao was reversed only after an estimated 2–3,000 Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops had been brought into the area.
We conclude that although recent movements make intensified anti-aircraft and ground action highly likely, they do not indicate any basic change in Communist tactics in Laos or in South Vietnam.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution.↩
- The battle for Binh Gia, 40 miles southeast of Saigon, took place from December 28, 1964, to January 4, 1965, the longest battle of the war in South Vietnam to that point.↩
- Operation Victorious Arrow was a FAR operation to retake Route 9 and Muong Phine in southern Laos. Unlike Operation Triangle in the north the previous year, U.S. aircraft did not play a major support role.↩