Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 9, 1964, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• South East Asia

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary Ambassador Thompson
  • Ambassador Kohler
  • Mr. Tyler
  • Mr. Akalovsky
• U.S.S.R.
  • Foreign Minister Gromyko
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • Mr. Smirnovsky, Chief, American Section, Foreign Ministry
  • Mr. Sukhodrev

[Here follows discussion about Vietnam, which is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume I, pages 990–992.]

The Secretary said that on this point it was best to start with Laos, since there was a recent accord in existence with respect to that country. If a Fourteen-Nation meeting were convened which was doomed to failure, that would worsen the situation, just as a deteriorating situation in the country lessened the prospects for success of the meeting. Our view was that if Souvanna Phoumi had left the 1962 conference as Prime Minister, he should not be asked to come to the conference now as something else, e.g., as Chairman of three factions unable to speak without agreement among the three. It was the Soviet Union who had supported Souvanna in 1962. We had accepted him and we believed he should return to the conference as Prime Minister.

The Secretary continued that another problem was that for two years the ICC had not been permitted to carry out its activities on the part of Laos under Pathet Lao’s control, except to go to Kang Khai and ask Souvannavong what his wishes were. That was a flagrant violation of the 1962 accords. We would be willing to go to the conference if those who came there felt bound by the 1962 accords and did not start all over again, as if no agreement had ever been reached. In other words, the question was the attitude of Hanoi. Were they going to leave their neighbors alone? If not, we had a serious problem.

Mr. Gromyko said he didn’t like the Secretary’s remarks. The Secretary appeared to be against holding a conference on Vietnam or Laos; at least he was advancing preliminary conditions for such conferences. Mr. Gromyko said he did not believe that this was in the interest of the U.S. The U.S. seemed to want to expand the war. Of course, he recognized that the Secretary had his own views, but if the U.S. wanted to improve the situation, he did not see how it could object to holding conferences on Vietnam and Laos. He did not think the Secretary’s negative position was justified. In any event, the U.S. could state to the conference the views the Secretary had just set forth to him.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Gromyko, as Co-Chairman, would make it clear in inviting Laos that he was inviting Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister.

Mr. Gromyko replied that the question of form was of secondary importance and that it could be resolved once there was agreement to hold a meeting. The Secretary should reply whether the U.S. was willing to have a conference.

The Secretary said we wanted to know what we were attending. We wanted to know who would represent Laos.

Mr. Gromyko said this was not a serious problem, and perhaps the three factions would reach agreement on this point. In any event, those who objected to conferences did not look very good.

The Secretary observed that we had thought this problem could be gotten around through the Polish proposal. However, Hanoi and Peiping had said no and that was the end of it. Mr. Gromyko said that in any event the meeting as proposed by Poland would have been only preparatory.

The Secretary noted that he was rather sensitive as to who represented Laos, because when he had arrived at the last conference, there had been an understanding between the two Co-Chairmen which had not been communicated to him. He then asked whether Mr. Gromyko had heard anything about Souvannavong’s reply to Souvanna.

Mr. Gromyko had no information on this point. He said he wished to note that now the U.S. had two princes under its influence. Indeed the Laotian capital was surrounded by Phoumi’s troops and even neutral troops were absent from Vientiane. Moreover, after Pholsena’s assassination, neutrals were afraid to come to Vientiane and were concerned about their safety.

The Secretary observed there had been rumors that Pholsena had been involved in the assassinations of some neutral leaders. [Here follows discussion about Vietnam; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume I, pages 992–993.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved in S on December 30. The memorandum indicates it was Part V of VII. This was a luncheon meeting at the Soviet Embassy.