134. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- The Problem of Renewal of Special Powers to Souvanna’s Government
Summary
On October 7, 1964, the special powers granted the Government of National Union of Laos by the National Assembly expire. Failure of the Assembly to renew these powers could lead to a governmental crisis. In [Page 274] such an event the Souvanna government might be forced to resign followed by strong pressures for a new government excluding the PL. Our latest information indicates, however, that General Phoumi and the Sananikones, whose rivalry for power figures intimately in the special powers issue, are prepared to go along with a request from Souvanna for renewal, thus avoiding a governmental crisis. However, the renewal can only extend until next spring when the Assembly’s term expires. The constitutional requirement for national elections will then become a crucial issue. Here again, however, it is likely that a compromise can be worked out postponing elections.
Background
In October 1962, the Lao National Assembly granted Souvanna’s Government of National Union special powers for one year to govern without reference to the National Assembly. These powers were renewed for another year in October 1963. They expire on October 7, 1964.
There was not much difficulty in 1962 in obtaining Assembly agreement to grant the special powers and thus give the coalition government the opportunity to carry out its mission. At that time the possibility existed that the objectives of the Lao tripartite agreements for national reconciliation and unification could be achieved under the Geneva settlement. Moreover, the 1961 Zurich communiqué between the three princes, the basic agreement underlying the coalition government, had provided that the provisional Government of National Union would be formed without reference to the National Assembly. (This was necessary because neither the Pathet Lao nor, at that time, the neutralists recognized the Assembly, claiming it was created by “rigged” elections in 1960.) Before renewing the special powers in October 1963, questions were raised in the National Assembly as to whether this should be done since the coalition government had made no progress toward achieving its objectives. Nevertheless, as a sign of support for Souvanna, the special powers were renewed on the condition that Souvanna report to the Assembly on the results of the trip he had just made to France, the United States, the United Nations, England and the U.S.S.R.
Last May a dispute arose over the interpretation of the period for which special powers had been granted in October 1963. Some argued that the period extended only from the time the Assembly recessed, after granting special powers, to its reconvening in May. Others argued the powers has been granted until October 1964. The latter view finally prevailed but the dispute foreshadowed the likelihood of a battle in the Assembly over renewal in October.
[Page 275]Rivalry Among Conservatives
The Assembly is dominated by the conservatives, although there are some neutralist (but no PL) Deputies. Its President is Phoui Sananikone who controls a large bloc of Deputies. Another large bloc is subject to General Phoumi’s control. The rivalry between the Sananikones and Phoumi for general control of the conservative faction has been increasingly intense, especially since April 19, 1964. Before the attempted coup Phoumi was pretty much in the saddle, despite latent divisions and rivalries among the conservatives. The Sananikones up to that point were fairly inactive politically. Phoui, leader of the clan, emerged from semi-retirement in May 1963, when he was elected President of the Assembly, and began to take a more active interest in affairs of state. At first these activities appeared to be constructive and in support of Souvanna and his policies. For example, Phoui supported the formation of a parliamentary group which made trips around the country to areas accessible to the government, in support of Souvanna and the policy of neutrality. It thus appeared that at last all important non-communist elements in Laos were uniting behind and in support of Souvanna—the hope we had when we signed the Geneva Agreements.
It was not long, however, before rumors began to circulate in Vientiane that the Sananikones again had ambitions of their own for political leadership. On several occasions Ambassador Unger had talks with Phoui to ensure he understood that the United States supported Souvanna and the Geneva settlement and that we would not view with approval any attempt to upset existing arrangements. Phoui always agreed and affirmed his support for this policy. Earlier this year, however, it began to become clear that the Sananikones were no longer satisfied to take a back seat. There is no question that they took advantage of the growing discontent and frustrations of the conservatives not only with the Government of National Union but also with Phoumi’s monopoly of conservative leadership. Although Phoui remained behind the scenes and tried to appear non-involved, his brother Oun (also a Deputy) was very much involved in the attempted coup last April.
While the coup failed to achieve its purpose of upsetting the Government of National Union, it did succeed in diminishing the power and influence of General Phoumi and reasserting an influential role for the Sananikones. However, it still did not put the Sananikones in a position of unchallenged leadership of the conservative faction. This has been particularly disappointing to Oun Sananikone, the real troublemaker in the clan.
Special Powers and Government of National Union
The question of Assembly renewal of the special powers gives the Sananikones another opportunity to strengthen their political position. [Page 276] If the Assembly fails to renew the special powers, Souvanna’s government will be vulnerable to a no-confidence vote forcing its resignation. Various conservatives, including the Sananikones, and even some neutralists, have made it clear they see no purpose in continuing with the Government of National Union. They favor reorganization of the government to exclude the Pathet Lao completely. This the attempted coup had hoped to achieve but only succeeded instead, because of United States and other international opposition, in obtaining replacement of dissident neutralist cabinet members and, subsequently, of certain conservative members.
Various proposals have been put forth concerning reorganization of the government. One would have the King or Crown Prince assume the powers of the premiership but it is unlikely the King would agree to this. Another would have the King reappoint Souvanna to form a government excluding the PL. Still another would have the King appoint an unnamed Prime Minister.
Present Status of Special Powers Issue
At first Phoumi indicated he saw no problem with the Assembly’s renewing the special powers. Later, however, as his duel with the Sananikones intensified, Phoumi claimed the mood of the Assembly was such that renewal would not be feasible. Phoumi blamed the Sananikones for this situation and the Sananikones blamed Phoumi. Nevertheless, largely no doubt as a result of our making it clear we did not favor any attempt to upset the applecart, both Phoumi and Phoui are now saying that if Souvanna requests it the Assembly will renew the special powers. We have instructed Ambassador Unger to use his influence as appropriate to ensure that this is done. The King apparently also shares our view there should be no change in the situation. We should know during the course of the week whether there will be difficulties.
Election Issue
The Assembly’s term expires in April 1965 when, according to the Constitution, new elections must be held. The renewal of special powers would thus be only for the balance of the Assembly’s term. The question of the elections also poses a problem since it seems unlikely they can be held under present conditions in Laos. The Lao have been considering this problem and seem to feel the matter can be resolved under a constitutional provision permitting the Assembly, meeting jointly with the King’s Council, to suspend, in effect, the constitutional requirement that elections be held every five years. Ambassador Unger is sending us his views on this issue.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 LAOS. Confidential. Drafted by Barbis. A note on this memorandum indicates that Rusk requested it and that he saw it.↩