126. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- SAR Operations in Laos
REF
- CINCPAC 190252Z August 19642
In the referenced message, CINCPAC addresses the problem of timely execution of search and rescue missions in Laos which are [Page 261] required when pilots are forced down in Communist-held territory. On two recent occasions, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos has requested and received U.S. jet fighter “cap” for these missions because his own in-country resources were inadequate to cope with the expected Pathet Lao/Viet Minh opposition. Current procedures for handling such requests call for processing them through a number of command echelons with a consequent delay in obtaining the necessary action.
CINCPAC therefore recommends that the tactical commander on the scene be given the authority to respond to requests for SAR support by the U.S. Ambassador without having to obtain authority from Washington. The chances for successful rescue are best if the SAR attempt is made before the enemy has time to react effectively, and the downed pilot is still in good physical condition. When jet aircraft support is needed, the sooner it can be provided the more certain it is that the actual helicopter rescue can be made with minimum risk to all involved, as the surprise, speed, and force of the attack will have greater effect against unorganized opposition. Also, it is generally believed that failure to provide the U.S. jet fighter “cap” when a Lao or Thai pilot is lost—when it is clear that we would use such a cap if the pilot were American—would give a very bad impression to our allies.
State and Defense (including the JCS) agree that CINCPAC’s recommendation is sound and appropriate. The attached draft message3 will accomplish the objective. It has some safeguards built in. I recommend Presidential approval.4