Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 3, 1964.

219. Deptel 110.² In trying to look ahead and chart course for next several months we have military and political programs to follow which inevitably inter-relate and interact on each other in obvious ways, nevertheless I will discuss them separately. Common background for both is assumption that if possible we would still prefer to realize something along lines Geneva solution mapped out 1962 and that our current firmer words and actions are undertaken in hope they may bring PL, North Vietnamese, and Chinese into line. If this fails then we will still be seeking equilibrium in which Souvanna and his government could continue survive and hopefully improve situation until opportunity (such as might come with Vietnamese settlement) opened up for working toward lasting solution, although stronger application force may be required to assure such equilibrium maintained. Is possibility our actions here may meanwhile be deeply affected by requirements of Vietnam situation.

Military

Immediate tasks in this field are to consolidate gains Operation Triangle and to firm up defenses of Muong Soui by taking Phou Kout, perhaps Phou Keng and other similar defensive moves. Generally concur in analysis of current situation set forth refDeptel.

We must surely also reach understanding with Souvanna Phouma and military here as to what are their goals in foreseeable future. Optimism and overconfidence engendered by recent success has stimulated loose talk of retaking PDJ, cleaning out northwest (see A–45),³ combined ground-air operation on Tchepone, etc. US statements about support and our readiness let down some of past barriers and even engage US personnel in limited fashion have revived hopes of ever present “AAR party” in Laos, who would like to resume anti-Communist crusade of early 1960’s, casting aside Geneva Accords and counting on considerable US military and financial support. Therefore, we must now make abundantly clear we do not support goal retaking all Laos by force of arms or even quite justifiable objective of cleaning Viet Minh out of country. They should understand what we do support is steady strengthening of positions through political, social, economic as well as military programs, to be sure in first place this zone can be held securely. Meanwhile current efforts toward negotiated solution should be given full chance to work out equilibrium, conceivably with strengthened ICC or UN support.

Once we and Lao understand each other on limits of our current military goals then we should study carefully what areas beyond those immediate tasks already mentioned deserve first priority treatment to assure solid defense of free Laos.

Where else should there be carried through carefully prepared and well supported action such as Operation Triangle which would consolidate territory free Laos and make it easier defend without predictably provoking enemy reaction beyond power of national forces to contain? Given our special interests in corridor question this study should also consider what actions can be taken there. Without pretending to give any final or all-inclusive answers, following kinds of operations illustrate point: retake Tha Thom, retake Nhommarath and Mahaxay, secure triangle Pakse-Attopeu-Saravane, secure Mekong for traffic Ban Houei Sai-Luang Prabang-Vientiane, reestablish Meo in at least some of areas east of Xieng Khouang ville, etc.

At same time also map out with Lao long range improvement plan for armed forces which could assure maintenance of order in country if there is no significant outside interference. This should envisage forces adapted to country’s terrain and lack of infra-structure and geared as far as possible to its financial possibilities over long run. Once plans for this long range improvement well underway (perhaps 9 months or a year hence) and assuming no successful negotiated settlement reached interim, then serious consideration can begin to be given to gradual reestablishment RLG authority throughout country. Realistically, however, not much can be accomplished in this direction until there is a settlement in Vietnam and North Vietnamese are ready to leave Laos.

Political

Immediate political goal is holding of tripartite meeting; preferably Switzerland. Admittedly we do not expect such meeting to achieve anything and we recognize in atmosphere of such a meeting there may be difficulties keeping Souvanna from making risky concession on his preconditions. Nevertheless, meeting offers only means of containing pressures for 14-nation conference, and at same time opportunity for establishing defensible basis for rejecting 14-nation conference when it clear PL will not meet Souvanna’s preconditions and, perhaps, will insist on entirely unacceptable status for him at conference. Tripartite meeting also gets Souvanna to Europe, after which refreshment he can probably be coaxed on to continue here for further indefinite period.

If unexpectedly tripartite meeting “successful” in that PL meet preconditions then we will presumably be ready see 14-nation conference proceed. If not “successful” (or if it proves impossible convene tripartite meeting), as noted we have good case for rejecting that conference and perhaps no further action in international field need be contemplated for time being unless something can be devised which, unlike 14-nation conference, promises some improvement for us. If military situation still dangerous, this might be moment to turn to UN Security Council to put Lao problem and Communist violations Geneva Accords before world forum. Depending particularly on Soviet position at that time, this might be done in expectation some effective Security Council action or, more likely, for purpose of showing impossibility controlling situation through UN and thereby providing justification for intervention by SEATO powers or the like.

Meanwhile in Vientiane there is ever present risk of Government being upset by one or other irresponsible group and of single voice commanding international respect which Souvanna now represents being dissipated into a confusion of extreme groups calling for massive military solution along lines of anti-Communist crusade with strong support from US, including ground forces as in past. It will be essential for us here to make clear that US support will not be forthcoming for such irresponsible groups.

Foregoing military and political program rests on continuance what has been our settled line on Laos at least since 1961. Needless to say if because of Vietnam situation or other larger policy considerations basic lines of our thinking have been changed, then what is outlined above also would require modification. Plan is admittedly for immediate future, a limited policy which promises no full solution but which seeks to avoid either loss of free Laos (within about present limits) to Communists or substantial involvement of US forces in fighting in Laos.

Unger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Moscow, Warsaw, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, Bangkok, Saigon,CINCPAC, and USUN, and passed to the White House,DOD, and CIA.
2. In telegram 110 to Vientiane, July 31, the Department suggested that there was for the moment “a certain balance of force” in the critical north-central part of Laos. The PL/NVN forces would probably absorb the shock of Operation Triangle and wait to apply military counterpressure, especially in the face of enhanced T–28 capability and Thai support of the Royal Lao Government. If this analysis was correct, the Department thought it likely the PL would negotiate with Souvanna in a tripartite context looking toward a 14-nation conference. (Ibid.)
3. Dated July 28. (Ibid.)