115. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (Sullivan) to Secretary of State Rusk1

SUBJECT

  • Week-end Developments in Vietnam and Laos

Proposal for Air Operations in the Laos Panhandle

We cabled Ambassador Unger yesterday a description of possible air strikes against Ho Chi Minh Trail targets in the Laos Panhandle area and asked him whether he thought he could sell this idea to Souvanna Phouma.2 Unger replied this morning that either GVN or joint GVN-U.S. air attacks on the Laos Panhandle would probably be unacceptable to Souvanna Phouma, who regards the Ho Chi Minh Trail as Vietnam’s problem and not his. Souvanna Phouma would argue that we should do more in the Plaine des Jarres and even attack North Vietnam rather than put him in the position of having to accept air attacks by South Vietnam on the southern part of Laos. Unger also believes that such air attacks [Page 241] would trigger further escalation and upset the Geneva Accords. (Vientiane’s 170, attached)3

We repeated the proposal for air attacks on the Panhandle to Ambassador Taylor for his personal information. We have not yet had his reaction to the proposal as such,4 although he did apparently refer to the idea in the most general terms while he was talking to Khanh in Dalat yesterday.

Operation Triangle—Laos

Today’s reports indicate that the joint FAR/Neutralist three-pronged movement of troops to secure the area at the junction of Routes 7 and 13 (the east-west road across the Plaine des Jarres from North Vietnam and the north-south road linking Vientiane with Luang Prabang) has started. The forces coming up from Vang Vieng in the south have attacked two Pathet Lao villages and appear to have taken them. The forces from the north and east are moving, but have as yet met no opposition. It is too early to say whether Operation Triangle will be in any sense successful, but it seems to have produced a strong political reaction from Souphanouvong, who has complained about it to the co-chairmen.

In the meantime, the Soviets have told us that they are going to insist on a 14-nation Geneva Conference on Laos and have threatened to quit as co-chairmen unless we accept. The British Foreign Secretary is on his way to Moscow, where he will discuss Southeast Asia with Gromyko and possibly Khrushchev. Our position at this point is that we will not go to a conference unless the Pathet Lao withdraw to their positions in the Plaine des Jarres as of May 16. If Operation Triangle is successful, however, there might be the makings of a compromise in the event we wanted to find one.

[Here follows information on internal developments in South Vietnam, with the exception of the fact that Taylor raised the issue of joint studies of initiatives against North Vietnam and the Laos panhandle, which took Khanh by surprise. Khanh was reportedly keen on the idea and agreed to think it over.]

  1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, Jul/Dec 1964. Top Secret. Sent through William Bundy.
  2. Transmitted in telegram 89 to Vientiane, July 26. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
  3. Not attached, but printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 579582.
  4. Taylor’s response was in telegram 236 from Saigon, July 27, ibid., pp. 582583. He did not feel any great urgency and recommended that action be delayed until he could produce a joint plan for the attacks with Khanh.