Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, June 27, 1964, 7:01 p.m.

1267. Joint State Defense message. In preparation decision highest levels² request addressee comments following tentative position with respect RLG plan for operation against Routes 13 and 7, and possible contingencies arising therefrom.³ Do not consult RLG or RTG except as specifically noted.

A. With respect to operation itself.

1. We would tell Souvanna we believe objective of cleaning out PL forces in this area and lifting morale RLG forces by demonstrated success is sound and that operation has reasonable chance of success. At same time we would stress that operation must be undertaken by RLG on own responsibility and with clear recognition possible risks and limits additional US action in event adverse developments as stated below. Also, per your 1707,⁴ we must be satisfied problems coordination and logistics worked out satisfactorily.

2. Souvanna must recognize that initiation of operation in itself probably increases possibility major Communist attack against Neutralist forces in Muong Soui. If such attack takes place, he must recognize that Muong Soui itself cannot be held even with extensive US air operations (problems of which set forth below) and that in this event we would strongly urge that Neutralist forces be in position to move west from Muong Soui seeking to link up with forces from Vang Vieng and Luang Prabang to establish firm and consolidated RLG-controlled area. We believe sacrifice Muong Soui area geographically would be good exchange for such consolidated position, and that preservation Neutralist forces crucial.

3. Vital that operation be represented to maximum as designed to assist threatened Neutralist forces in Muong Soui and thus defensive in character. We would take this line ourselves and assume that Souvanna would do likewise. Both of us should constantly reiterate our objective is preservation Geneva Accords. As your 1716⁵ notes, fact that opening move in operation is airlift GM-16 to Muong Soui is helpful factor in support this rationale, and if this operation becomes known we and Souvanna should certainly publicize on basis assisting in defense Muong Soui and forces there.

4. We are prepared to furnish additional T–28’s promptly [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] we do not believe US civilian pilots required for T–28’s in support of operation. However, US is prepared to use existing Air America aircraft, provide additional three C–123’s and three Caribou, and permit use of US civilian pilots to bring GM–16 up to Muong Soui and to provide continuing resupply of operation as required. (Our public and third-country position would be that the operation is mercenary Air America and not US Government and that, in any event, the operation relates directly to defense of Neutralist forces along lines para 3 above.) FYI: We also considering authorizing use of napalm if Souvanna requests and you approve, in support of this or any other operation and not merely in case major Communist attack as you have previously requested and we have authorized. End FYI.

5. Since stiffening of Muong Soui defenses crucial in any event, we working urgently with Thai to obtain additional gun crews and also engineers and supplies to conduct land-mining operations and also Thai air-ground controllers.

6. We prepared also to conduct added reconnaissance in operational area as necessary prior its initiation. (Operations of 27 June produced only 10 percent results as you know.) FYI: We have considered possible deterrent effect reconnaissance operations east of Muong Soui but are uncertain whether this effect great enough to warrant risk of loss in area obviously well defended. JCS believe any such low-level reconnaissance should be preceded by suppression strikes. Request your comment. End FYI.

7. FYI: Control and supervision of operation appear vital, and we would be prepared if you think necessary to augment your attaché personnel for this purpose. End FYI.

B. If Muong Soui subjected to major attack.

We have noted your telecon request that in this event we authorize US civilian pilots in T–28’s and also direct US Navy and USAF strikes against forces attacking Muong Soui. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] As to US air strikes (with or without “reconnaissance” cover) our view is that such action would not enable Muong Soui position to be held and would also be very difficult to conduct unless we had effective airground control in being.

Basically, we are concerned that Souvanna may have excessive view of what air can accomplish in this situation, and we reluctant get into large-scale US air strike operation that would in fact be militarily ineffective in countering the attack itself. At best we see any additional action at this point as being effort permit Neutralist forces withdraw and re-group in orderly fashion in accordance with para A(2) above.

However, we would consider what would in effect be series of punitive air attacks against PL military targets in PDJ and Route 7 areas. This would be designed punish other side and show our continued determination but avoid committing our air to vain attempt hold Muong Soui. We need to know how extensive punitive strikes you recommend.

On diplomatic front we would in any event continue to urge Polish proposals and to oppose Geneva conference both if operation takes place and if Muong Soui attacked. In latter event, we would contemplate urging Souvanna take his case to UN although we do not have any hope Security Council would vote for withdrawal or anything more than ceasefire. If outcome appeared likely be indecisive, we might, with him, avoid any formal appeal for action but at least use Security Council as platform dramatize continued Communist offensives and stress our adherence Geneva Accords and justification actions we would have taken and continuation such actions in response Communist action.

C. If Neutralist and RLG forces gravely threatened and disorganized.

Possibility must be faced that operation goes badly and/or Communist attack Muong Soui so effective as to disorganize Neutralist forces and prevent their effectively linking up with Bang Vieng and Luang Prabang forces to make a new government-held area along Route 13 and a small part of Route 7. In this event we would again consider penalty bombings possibly more sustained and extensive than covered under B above.

D. If Communists attack elsewhere in Laos.

Our current estimate here tends to support your judgment that this not likely in view Communist view other points along dividing line critical and might bring about drastic US intervention. However, we are particularly concerned that GM–16 withdrawal may invite action against Attopeu. If this occurred we would expect to authorize GVN air action in area but would also have to consider movement US air and ground forces to Thailand and possibly across Mekong if attack went further than Attopeu. Same possibility exists if Communists should attack at some other point threatening Mekong.

We have considered whether a US air and/or ground deployment to Thailand might be helpful in event of contingency C above and request Bangkok comments whether Thai might agree and approve and Vientiane comments whether such action would bolster Souvanna in this case. In Rusk-Thanom May 30 talks,⁶ attack on Muong Soui had not been included as part of what Thai viewed as major Communist push. However, current Vientiane estimate of seriousness fall of Muong Soui (Vientiane’s 1707) may mean that we should revise our calculations and that Thai would see matter in different light than at that time. We have noted Bangkok’s comment that Thai interested more in ground than air deployments, but likelihood would be that air forces would be employed before ground forces as indicated above.

For Bangkok: You should consult RTG immediately on pilots and on contingency basis on gun crews and also on air controllers and engineers for land-mining operations. Need your report on land mine availability and possible arrangements for shipment to Muong Soui. Since in these approaches you will be asking Thai for fairly substantial commitment, you may reveal Lao have requested our airlift support for GM–16 move to Muong Soui and that we are considering this and also further commitment to continuing airlift support for whole operation. You should seek get Thai reaction to chances of success for operation and generally consult as fully as you feel necessary while avoiding full commitment US support to operation at this time.

For CINCPAC: We note your 260707Z⁷ which underscores air control problem any US air operations in direct support Muong Soui. Request your comment whether Thai air controllers could help on this. You will note that this message modifies viewpoint stated Deptel 1250 to Vientiane in light subsequent exchanges indicating serious internal reactions if we do not support operation.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared with McNamara and in substance with Rusk, and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Thailand and repeated to Saigon, Paris, London, and CINCPAC.
2. On Saturday, June 27, Rusk met at the Department of State with McNamara, McNaughton, Meyers of CIA, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Trueheart to discuss Laos. At 12:40 p.m. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy returned to Rusk’s office. Rusk met with Ball at 1:47 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The drafting of this cable was no doubt discussed; for a brief account of the meeting, see Document 105.
3. In telegram 1251 to Vientiane, June 26, the Department suggested that as it and the Embassy were “out of step on the proposed operation,” they should discuss support for the offensive in a telephone conference at 1 p.m. Greenwich time on June 26. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
4. In telegram 1707 from Vientiane, June 26, the Embassy in Laos renewed its recommendation that the United States consider supporting the proposed FAR operation and gave reasons for doing so. It also answered specific questions raised in telegram 1251 to Vientiane in anticipation of the teleconference. (Ibid.) The text of the teleconference is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Muong Soui, Operation Triangle, Vol. I, 6/64–7/64.
5. Dated June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
6. Documentation on these talks is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Thailand in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII.
7. Dated June 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)