Office of the Historian

102. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM–561–64
Washington, June 27, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Additional T–28s in Laos (S)
1.
Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I–25638/64, dated 25 June 1964, subject as above.2
2.
In response to the reference, an estimate of the quick augmentation capability (e.g., within three to seven days) to expand the Royal Lao Armed Forces (FAR) T–28 force as a possible response to an early Pathet Lao (PL) move against Muong Soui is outlined as follows:
a.
Aircraft. The Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) has 20 T–28s available in Laos or at Udorn. It is estimated that 15 T–28s can be made available from RVN resources as a result of the conversion from T–28s to A–1H aircraft without detriment to the RVN war effort. The USAF Special Air Warfare (SAW) Detachment at Udorn could turn over an additional four aircraft. Thus, the total available aircraft is 39. Assuming a 75 per cent in commission rate, 29 aircraft should be operational.
b.
Pilots. The RLAF has 13 qualified T–28 pilots augmented by ten Thais. Six Air America pilots have also been checked out and are available. Thus, 29 RLAF/Thai/US civilian pilots could be available, matching the 29 operational aircraft.
c.
Additional Augmentation. The augmentation of the RLAF, outlined in subparagraph 2a above, would bring a halt to the present SAW training program of ten RLAF pilots scheduled to graduate on 9 August 1964. This training program is the only feasible short term source of RLAF T–28 pilots. Thailand has 61 T–28 pilots and 27 T–28 aircraft; however, their future contribution should not be taken for granted. The US Ambassador to Thailand has been requested (State to Vientiane, 1250, dated 24 June 1964)3 to ascertain the Thai responsiveness to additional contributions.
d.
Maintenance Capacity. The present maintenance capability in Laos, backed by various maintenance assets at Udorn, could support the RLAF for a short period. A sustained effort would require augmentation of the Udorn assets.
e.
Base Capacity. In view of the present inability to fly operational missions from Thailand, base loading in Laos would be a critical limitation. Careful planning between operational missions, maintenance flow back to Udorn and minimum ground time at Vientiane would be an absolute necessity.
f.
Implications of Using Non-Lao Pilots. The use of non-Lao pilots presents the risk of disclosure of intervention. There are problems now in preserving the cover of Thais participating in T–28 operations.
g.
A–1H Aircraft. The use of A–1H aircraft by either VNAF or US pilots would raise the problem of detracting from the war effort in the RVN. CINCPAC reports he doubts that the present basic qualifications of the RLAF pilots permits them to become combat pilots in the A–1H aircraft.
3.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that in any augmentation plan the four T–28 aircraft of the USAF SAW Detachment, Udorn, remain in place to continue to provide the only source of trained RLAF T–28 pilots, and that efforts be made to encourage the Thais to provide the required additional assets.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
JW Davis

Rear Admiral,
USN Deputy Director,
Joint Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 381, Jan-June 1964. Secret. A note on the source text indicates McNamara saw it.↩
  2. Not found.↩
  3. Document 101.↩