Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

94. Scope Paper Prepared for the SEATO Council Meeting¹

Washington, April 2, 1968.

SEATO/SEVEN NATION/ANZUS MEETINGS

Wellington, April 2–5, 1968

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING

U.S. Objectives

1. To underscore for the US, our SEATO allies, and other countries our strong support for SEATO and the importance we attach to it as the only multilateral security mechanism in Southeast Asia.

2. To demonstrate continuing SEATO support for the GVN in its effort to stem Communist aggression, to dramatize GVN appreciation for this support, and to emphasize SEATOʼs interest in a just and peaceful negotiated solution to the present conflict.

3. To emphasize SEATOʼs role in combatting Communist subversion in the Treaty Area, and specifically to demonstrate support for Thailand and the Philippines in suppressing Communist insurgency.

4. To give due emphasis to multilateral participation in SEATO projects such as military exercises, their civic action components, and the Organizationʼs non-military activities, including SEATOʼs cooperation in certain projects with non-member countries.

5. To overcome possible apprehension among SEATO members that the UK decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia portends a weakening of SEATOʼs ability to deter or defeat Communist aggression.

Means of Attaining Objectives

1. By strong public and private expositions of the US position on issues of concern to SEATO.

2. By working for a SEATO communiqué and developing public statements that will contain support for the GVN and US policies there as strong as or stronger than in prior years.

3. By emphasizing US support for the planned SEATO Seminar on Internal Security in Rural Areas.

4. By emphasizing also US support for cultural and economic projects, particularly when these are related to counter-insurgency and by stressing the fact that all of these projects have significant multilateral support from SEATO members.

Possible Obstacles

1. There is a tendency among the SEATO members to question the security significance of the organization and even Thailand, with no other treaty guarantee for its security, has at times been uneasy about the effectiveness of the U.S. commitment under SEATO.

2. The divergence of the policies of France, Pakistan and to a lesser degree of the UK from those of the other SEATO members constitutes a continuing problem, especially to Thailand and the Philippines. So also does the failure of France and, more recently, Pakistan to participate in SEATOʼs military activities.

3. With the new UK defense policy, UK participation in SEATO military activities can be expected to become more and more nominal. If the UK should be represented at the Council Meeting, as is possible, at a level lower than that of the Foreign Minister, the UK position might have little flexibility.

4. There has been an unimpressive showing by the US and others on the SEATO economic side since the resolution by the Council last year that it would give “sympathetic and urgent attention” to economic requests from Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-International Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182, CF 276. Secret. Drafted by Peter W. Colm of EA/RA and Bacon, cleared by Rusk and 16 relevant bureaus and offices of the Department of State, AID, and Department of Defense.