Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, November 23, 1966, 8:35 p.m.

90619. For Ambassador Goldberg from Sisco. I know from your telephone call the other day that you are concerned about the fact that we can not now commit ourselves to financial support of the Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia. While our AID people have been in regular contact with Goldschmidt, this matter is of such importance that it has undoubtedly come to the attention of the SYG and he will expect the fullest kind of explanation. We believe, therefore, that rather than to wait for his inquiry you should take the initiative at the earliest appropriate moment to explain our position in perspective and in context. For your background you should draw upon Deptel 72950 of October 25 and Deptel 85330 of November 15.² We can send you an appropriate officer if you feel you want added details.

Apart from desirable approach to the SYG, there is also the fact that SYG has called an informal meeting on the Prek Thnot project on November 25 the purpose being to provide governments interested in assisting Cambodia with information concerning the project and to address to these governments an appeal for cooperation and the necessary financing. In view of the fact that we will not be able to make any financial commitment, I would suggest that the Mission be represented at this meeting by Clarence Blau. This is not going to be a pledging session but rather discussion of the status of the Prek Thnot project and the question of financial support. If asked, suggest Blau should confine his comment on US inability to finance Prek Thnot to simple statement that legal and administrative complications exist at present time.

Following is pertinent information additional to that which is contained in above reftels for use in your private talk with U Thant.

When the President following his Baltimore address designated Eugene Black to be his representative on Southeast Asia social and economic development, he requested Black to invite U Thant to offer views as to how best to proceed with his responsibilities. At that time U Thant advised Black to avoid if possible advocacy of schemes that would have the appearance of American initiatives but rather to build upon the work of ECAFE and in particular progress already made by early 1965 in implementing a Mekong Valley development program and in creating an Asian Development Bank.

At the last session of the ECAFE plenary, it was decided that 1966 should be Cambodia Year for the Mekong Coordinating Committee. We consider it important that you impress upon U Thant:

(1) continued United States interest in the Mekong Coordinating Committeeʼs activities;

(2) our desire to see that Committee succeed in working out projects from which all the riparian countries, including Cambodia, can benefit;

(3) the continued readiness of the United States to give sympathetic consideration to making financial contributions to sound projects agreed upon by the Committee.

Having made these points clear, U Thant should be taken fully into our confidence as to why we are unable to make a commitment to assist in financing Prek Thnot at this time. U Thant should know that in August 1966 we did, in fact, state confidentially that under certain conditions we would contribute some $5 million to support the Prek Thnot project in Cambodia. We cannot carry out that commitment now because the United States Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act for 1967 with a provision that imposes upon the President the obligation to find that considerations of national security exist as justification for extending assistance to any country which furnishes items of economic or military assistance to North Viet Nam.

We must consider that the question of such assistance applies to the Viet-Cong as well as North Viet Nam. Cambodia is a source of supply for the Viet-Cong and has made token gifts to the NLF and to NVN in April and earlier. We do not believe that it would be consistent with the purposes sought by Cambodia, the United Nations, and the United States through the operations of the Mekong Coordinating Committee, to make—and publicly defend making—a United States financial contribution to Prek Thnot on grounds that this project in Cambodia served the national security interests of the United States.

We have not regarded support of projects in the Mekong Basin as serving cold war or military purposes. New legislation places the United States in a situation where a commitment to finance Prek Thnot would have to be justified to the Congress and to the world at large as motivated by national security considerations. To do so would be contrary to the basic policies the President supports. To do so would, we believe, present the probability that Prince Sihanouk would reject our assistance and cause him to abandon interest in the project itself. We hope that our decision not to assist in financing Prek Thnot at this time will not deter the Japanese Government, the United Nations and other potential donors from mobilizing the required resources.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, E 11–2 MEKONG. Secret. Drafted by Sisco and Barnett; cleared with Poats and Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Affairs; and approved by Sisco.
2. See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 80.