77. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Princeton Study on Neutralization in Southeast Asia Prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Problem:
Senator Fulbright has sent a study prepared at the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by four scholars at Princeton University (Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran Young) on Neutralization in SEA: Problems and Prospects (Tab A)2 to the President with the comment that “the recommendations, which are sober and sensible, merit the attention of you and your staff.”3 The President has requested you to discuss the best disposition of the study with Senator Fulbright.
Discussion:
1. We have reviewed the study and conclude that while it contains some thoughtful observations on the general problems and myriad complexities of neutralization in Southeast Asia, it is based on a general premise of dubious accuracy: to wit, that “big-power confrontation” can be prevented by neutralization, the price of which may be the acceptance of communist states which emerge as a result of “purely domestic communist pressure.” The study suggests the sketchy outlines of a “neutralization” model which underscores the difficulty of implementing such a plan. Finally, the study suggests that at the right time and under the right conditions, the US should consider exploring such a “neutralization” plan privately with the countries of the area.
2. The study begins with a review of the concept of neutralization and the historical experience of neutralized states. It recognizes that the key problem is not containing direct aggression but indirect aggression and concludes that it would be extremely difficult to calculate how neutralization night affect the pursuit of indirect aggression by states outside a neutralized zone. It discusses the maintenance of neutralization [Page 195] and the concept of control and control mechanisms, acknowledging the difficulty and complexity of such control, the discouraging precedents (e.g. Vietnam and Laos) for effective control machinery, the difficulty of sealing off borders from outside infiltration, and concludes that control problems for any neutralization plan in Southeast Asia would be very great.
3. The study assumes (p. 17) that the object of neutralization is to prevent the neutralized zone from becoming “an important focus of confrontation between powers external to the zone.” It concludes that “if violations mean only that the internal strife within the zone can continue largely without interference from outside, this may represent as much as we can hope for.” This point is not elaborated but appears to mean that violations from one “neutralized” state against another “neutralized” state may have to be accepted as “tolerable”. (i.e., from Vietnam to Laos or Cambodia.) We find this argument difficult to accept.
4. The study discusses at some length the problem of ascertaining whether a violation of neutrality has taken place, the question of unanimity on the part of the control mechanism, and the means by which a guarantor state could take unilateral action or the neutralized state could request help. The discussion underlines the complexity of the problem, admits the possibility of cheating and leads the authors to conclude that if the control mechanism is unable to agree on a violation, the only recourse may be for the neutralized state to renounce its neutrality.
5. The study concludes that the basic requirements for neutralization are (a). “minimal political stability within the neutralized state or states”, (b). a balance of forces among relevant external powers—at least the US, USSR, and Communist China, and (c). an effective control mechanism. It points out the advantages and disadvantages to the three powers in (b) above of a neutralized Southeast Asia. The key advantages cited for the US are realization of the US objective of enabling the neutralized states to develop their own destinies themselves and to receive economic assistance at the same time that substantially fewer US troops would be required in the area (the maintenance of “adequate forces in neighboring areas to fulfill its responsibilities as a guarantor power” is assumed in the study). The main disadvantage would be the need for the US to accept communist takeovers in the guaranteed states “as along as they resulted—without appreciable foreign assistance—from the evolving balance of domestic political forces” (p. 30), including the use of violence. We see this as a critical disadvantage, indeed, and question the quantification of “appreciable foreign assistance.”
6. The authors acknowledge their doubts as to the sincerity with which Peking would enter any agreement for neutralization. The advantages for Peking are listed mainly as the removal of US troops from the neutralized area (although it is assumed Peking would accept US troops [Page 196] in neighboring areas) and the possibility of gaining US acquiescence in “indigenous” communist revolutions. Soviet interests are seen primarily in terms of Soviet desire not to be drawn into any conflict in SEA. Since Soviet interests in neutralization are seen essentially as negative, the studyʼs implicit argument that the USSR might be an effective guarantor state seems itself dubious.
7. The study acknowledges that the hurdles in the way of any agreement would be formidable, that at best neutralization in SEA would not be as effective as in Europe, and that civil strife and political revolutions would probably continue in the area. It argues, however, that under neutralization these would be less likely to lead to international conflicts than otherwise.
8. The study urges that private, preliminary, exploratory negotiations be conducted by the US to “test existing national policies in regard to SEA.” It is not completely clear what is meant by this and in view of the risks in terms of proper timing described in the study itself (p. 37), it is difficult to ascertain how and when the authors of the study would envisage proceeding. The study does note, however, that if both we and the communists envisaged “stalemate or worse” in Vietnam, the advantage of neutralization would look impressive.
Recommendations:4
9. a. That Ambassador MacArthur or myself review with Carl Marcy5 our general reactions to the Princeton Study as set forth above. Marcy would be told that the Department has itself been examining and will continue to study this subject and welcomes the contribution to an extremely difficult and complex problem made by the study. Marcy would also be informed that you would be prepared to discuss the matter directly with Senator Fulbright, if the Senator so desires.
b. That the attached Department memorandum (Tab B)6 on “Neutralization and Southeast Asia” prepared for Senator Lausche last month be passed to the Committee through Marcy as an example of the Departmentʼs thinking on this subject.
c. That a copy of this memorandum be sent to Walt Rostow in the White House.
d. That no presentation be made to the Cabinet on the subject at this time; and
e. That Marcy be told the Department has no objection to the study being circulated to all members of the Committee and that, while we agree it might be preferable that the study not be published because of [Page 197] the general complexity of the subject and some of the deficiencies of the study, we would not object if the Committee decided to make it public.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 8 Asia SE. Confidential. Drafted by Paul H. Kreisburg of FE/ACA with the concurrence of Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas A. MacArthur. Read sent this memorandum to Rostow on August 8.↩
- Attached, but not printed.↩
- Fulbright made these comments in a June 6 letter to President Johnson, attached but not printed.↩
- Rusk initialed approval of all recommendations on July 26.↩
- Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩
- Attached, but not printed.↩