Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

55. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, March 30, 1965.

SUBJECT

• SEATO Council Meeting

We believe that our main objectives at the SEATO Council Meeting in London, May 3–5, should be related to Viet-Nam. We suggest the meeting be used:

1. To obtain solid SEATO support for South Viet-Nam, including an endorsement of the air strikes against North Viet-Nam.

2. To demonstrate that the U.S. does have allies (like Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines) who are firmly lined up with us on Viet-Nam.

3. To give the Vietnamese Government through an open presentation by its observer at the meeting the opportunity to get its case across better in Europe.

This approach on Viet-Nam will not be welcomed by the French and perhaps by the Pakistani. They may sit quietly by without endorsing it, or they may seek to register objection by absenting themselves from certain sessions or by taking exception in the communiqué. The French are unlikely to react more strongly in view of the indication that they will probably be represented by an “observer” only.

We suggest that we move ahead with determination on the Viet-Nam issue at the meeting. We may be able to devise procedures that could get around any obstacles the French or Pakistani might interpose. We would propose lining up prior support from other friendly delegations.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached Scope Paper for the SEATO Council Meeting which reflects the approach described above.²

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING

London, May 3–5, 1965

SCOPE PAPER

U.S. Objectives

1. To obtain solid SEATO support for the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in its struggle against Communist aggression from North Viet-Nam.

2. To take advantage of the fact that the meeting is in London and demonstrate to European governments and public opinion that the South Vietnamese Government and people strongly resist the Communist effort to control them, and that this is not simply a civil war within South Viet-Nam.

3. To demonstrate also to world public opinion that the Vietnamese and U.S. Governments have the firm political support of both Asian (e.g., Thailand and Philippines) and non-Asian (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) allies.

4. To reassure Thailand of firm SEATO backing against the incipient signs of externally-instigated Communist insurgency.

5. To keep SEATOʼs focus on Communist threats by diverting to bilateral discussion any Pakistan or Philippine efforts to raise the Indian and Indonesian threats.

Means of Attaining Objectives

1. By developing a strong U.S. statement for the opening public session.

2. By inducing Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand to make similar substantive opening statements.

3. By seeking to have the Vietnamese observer address the opening public session in order to get the Vietnamese case across to European opinion.

4. By adoption of a vigorously worded communiqué which includes specific endorsement of the air action being undertaken against North Viet-Nam.

5. By inclusion in the communiqué of praise for contributions to the support of Viet-Nam by both SEATO members and non-members, with specific reference to the military personnel furnished by the Republic of Korea. The communiqué should also appeal for further assistance to Viet-Nam by Free World nations, both SEATO members and non-members.

6. By making it publicly clear that Thailand has now been designated by the Communists as their next target in Southeast Asia after Viet-Nam, and that SEATO members will fully abide by their commitments to Thailand.

Possible Obstacles

1. The U.K. may be concerned that a vigorous approach could produce fireworks. We should seek to persuade the U.K. that this is the only approach which has real political value against the Communists in Southeast Asia.

2. France may object strenuously both to inviting the Vietnamese observer to address the Council and to the type of communiqué we propose. We should let the French know in advance that we intend to move ahead as indicated. We should also line up prior support for the U.S. position by friendly delegations.

3. Pakistan may side with France in its objections to the proposed treatment of the Viet-Nam issue. Prior to the Council Meeting we should let Pakistan know in general terms about our proposed approach since Pakistan might then choose to be represented at a level lower than Foreign Minister Bhutto as a means of muting its opposition.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2498. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall, cleared by Salans, Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs Robert C. Creel and Near Eastern Affairs William J. Hadley. The attached Scope Paper was drafted by Mendenhall on March 26.
2. Rusk initialed his approval of the Scope Paper.