Office of the Historian

370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1

Washington, November 22, 1967, 1550Z.

73183. Ref: A) State 68166;2 B) Bangkok 6269.3

1.
We have given careful consideration to the arguments set forth in ref B that we delay presentation of our request for stationing additional B–52s at U-Tapao. We clearly recognize the problems involved. It has been decided at the highest level, however, that on balance the military requirements of the war in Vietnam set forth in ref A are overriding. You should, therefore, present this request to the RTG ASAP.
2.
In making this presentation, you may wish to make the following points: (a) there is a direct relationship between the present request to deploy additional B–52s to U-Tapao and the security of Thai troops currently in Vietnam and those to be deployed since massive concentration of B–52s firepower has proven effective means of breaking up enemy concentration of forces. As noted in ref A we do not currently have surge capability and we do not wish to be restricted again as we were during recent fighting on DMZ. As Thai are aware B–52s have also been used against targets transitting Mugia Pass into Laos and thus reduced infiltration of enemy forces which could be brought to bear against Thai contingents. (b) During Clifford-Taylor discussions4 Thai leaders made strong argument for increased bombing as means of shortening war. Thai failure to approve deployment now being requested would appear to be inconsistent with this position. (c) You should also stress our appreciation of the problems which growing American presence creates and point out that we have given special consideration to the matter of on-base housing for the additional 1000 personnel which this deployment would require. Although these personnel will have to live in sub-standard housing initially, USAF prepared to accept this hardship to its personnel, (1) because of overriding military necessity for early deployment of B–52s and (2) out of consideration for Thai problems.
3.
We appreciate the points made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of ref B5 and the need to give the Thai greater insight into our thinking on where we go from here. We are preparing such material and will be communicating it to you.
4.
In instructing you to present this request to the RTG, ASAP, we have taken into account your view that this step may limit our flexibility in seeking to resolve the SOFA negotiations and could subject us to greater pressure for additional resources to meet the problems which you have highlighted in para 3 ref B. However, it is considered judgment here that B–52 deployment must take first priority.6
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Spear, cleared in draft with Habib, in substance with Steadman, and by Jorden of the White House; and approved by Bundy.↩
  2. In telegram 68166 to Bangkok, November 13, the Department informed the Embassy that it desired to increase the number of B–52s permanently based at U-Tapao Air Base from 15 to 25 so as to mount 800 Arc Light sorties per month from Thailand. The Embassy was instructed to approach the Thai Government for its permission for the augmentation. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 6269 from Bangkok, November 20, the Embassy suggested that having just completed the negotiations for deployment of a Thai Division to South Vietnam, this was “a psychologically unfavorable moment” to ask for additional B–52s at U-Tapao. They gave reasons for their judgment and suggested a 10-day to 2-week delay in raising the matter with the Thai Government. (Ibid.)↩
  4. During their mission to exchange views on Vietnam and obtain additional allied ground forces, see Document 350.↩
  5. In these paragraphs the Embassy suggested that the Thai were becoming increasingly negative about the U.S. military presence in Thailand and were increasingly concerned about local Thai communities being overloaded by U.S. base personnel.↩
  6. Printed from an unsigned copy.↩