Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

37. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, May 25, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton May 27–28

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk and the briefing book on this visit.²

I passed on to Ambassador Waller your hope that Gorton would attend the Rusk luncheon, and your intention to find a way to give the visit a tone of particular cordiality. As the schedule has shaped up, it may be rather difficult to do this. Your second meeting with Gorton is taking place at 11:30 a.m. on Tuesday. It cannot be a long visit because Gorton is due at the National Press Club at 12:15. You may have your own plan for giving the visit a public note of unusual cordiality, but if you want suggestions I have three, in ascending order of effectiveness.

1. You could “spontaneously” accompany Gorton to the luncheon at the State Department following your first meeting with him on Monday. This is not a public luncheon but your departure from the schedule would become known and attract some public comment.

2. You could “spontaneously” accompany Gorton to his speech at the National Press Club on Tuesday, introducing him with some warm words. This would, of course, get heavy press coverage.

3. If you go through with your tentative plans to go to the Ranch on Wednesday, you could have Gorton as a weekend guest. As it now stands, Gorton is due to start back to Australia on Friday afternoon after a heavy schedule in New York. He could instead fly to the Ranch, spend the weekend with you, and catch an Australian airline flight from San Francisco on Sunday, June 2, at 8:00 p.m. This, of course, would be by far the most effective way of dramatizing your special regard for Australia.

Gorton will have three main concerns:

1. Our political situation and its implications for our Asia policy. I suggest you review the situation fully, stressing that the facts do not warrant a conclusion that the U.S. is about to retreat from Asia.

2. The situation in Vietnam and Paris. He will expect a full exchange and has been very sensitive in the past about the need for full and prior consultation before we take any new departures. He will want to hear your thoughts about what to do if the talks continue to be unproductive, and your plans in regard to the bombing pause under the various contingencies.

Gorton has publicly ruled out any increases in Australian forces in Vietnam, barring some major change in the situation. (The Australians have about 8,000 men—three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, one bomber squadron, two helicopter squadrons and a tank squadron.)

3. UK withdrawal from Malaysia-Singapore. Gorton seems to be backing away from the earlier Australian plan to maintain a force in Malaysia after the British withdrawal in 1971. He has talked publicly about the possibility of a “Fortress Australia” approach. He may press hard on the idea that Australia cannot undertake commitments in the Malaysia-Singapore area without a firm guarantee of U.S. support and protection under the ANZUS Treaty. I suggest you adhere to our previous line that:

• —we think a continued Australian military presence would be a valuable stabilizing factor;
• —we realize questions about the application of ANZUS might arise in connection with such deployments;
• —we would like to stay in close consultation about the matter;
• —but we cannot give a blanket guarantee.

You should be aware that this whole problem may come to a head at the Five-Power Commonwealth meeting (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) scheduled for Kuala Lumpur in June.

All of the above points are covered well and in more detail in Secretary Ruskʼs memo to you.

You might discuss with Gorton your plans for announcing an Ambassador to Australia.

A particular point of interest: Mrs. Gorton was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts; grew up in Bangor, Maine; and still retains her American citizenship. She is dual national, also having Australian citizenship.

Gorton is a very different kind of fellow from Harold Holt. Rather than ruling by consensus with his Cabinet, Gorton is attempting to dominate his colleagues. He is also attempting to handle foreign and defense affairs directly from the Prime Ministerʼs office, cutting the External Affairs and Defense Ministers out. Thus it is that he is accompanied only by members of his personal staff.³

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Australia, Visit of Prime Minister Gorton, May 27–28, 1968. Secret. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.
2. Ruskʼs May 24 memorandum to the President is ibid., and the Department of State copy is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 AUSTL. The briefing book was attached to a May 2 memorandum from Read to Rostow, ibid.
3. The Embassy in Australia prepared an assessment of the Gorton government which concluded that it had internal problems despite its strong public support. Gorton was more likely than the late Prime Minister Holt to view issues narrowly in terms of Australiaʼs self interests. (Telegram 5576 from Canberra, May 13; ibid.; POL 15–1 AUSTL) The Embassy also prepared a list of anticipated topics for the visit. (Telegram 5575, May 13; ibid., POL 7 AUSTL)