351. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination (Trueheart) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)1
SUBJECT
- Mr. Bundyʼs Meeting with Mr. Smith, August 10, 19672
PARTICIPANTS
- Messrs. Bundy, Berger, and Habib for EA; [names not declassified]; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; and Mr. Underhill of EA for Indonesia item
Thailand
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported briefly on the situation in northeastern Thailand, pointing out that the Thais were moving [Page 781] in the right direction, although perhaps not as fast as we would like. In order for us to encourage an expanded effort we would have to continue to cajole and exhort. Mr. Berger said that he had lunch with General Stilwell and the general felt that the Thai were not putting out enough effort and that they would probably fail to strengthen the governmentʼs position in the northeast in time to prevent successful Communist subversion. This view seemed quite different from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Could [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] account for it?
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Gen. Stilwell, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Embassy in the person of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had access to the same facts. The general tended to take a somewhat more pessimistic view because he reflected in part the pique of some of the top-ranking Thai military at having to turn over command of some of their troops to the joint Thai organization prosecuting the effort in the northeast. Gen. Stilwell also tended to believe that not enough pressure was being applied to the Thai. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] implied that he, and the Ambassador, believed that the Thai could not be driven, but must be coaxed to act in their own best interests.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that he felt that the situation in southern Thailand, along the Thai-Malaysian border was becoming critical. The Communists were telling the Thai that they were interested in going south, not north, and that they would not act against Thailand if they were left alone. There had never been any real Thai cooperation with the Malaysians. Only police were used by the Thai in the so-called joint Thai-Malaysian operations, and the Communists were always tipped-off before a drive. There was evidence, too, that some of the Thai military were selling arms to the Communists.
Mr. Bundy then asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for his forecast on the promulgation of a constitution and the holding of elections. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that Pote, Thanom, and Sawang were all of the firm opinion that a constitution would be adopted before the end of the year, and that elections would probably be held in late 1968. Mr. Bundy then asked if Ambassador Unger had been briefed on the 303 Committee authorization [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to provide support for the organization of political parties. Mr. Stuart replied that he had not because of his illness, but that on his return to duty both he and the new country director would be provided with the proposal and the minutes of the Committee. Mr. Bundy then said he would like to review the matter and might mention it to Ambassador Kohler. Mr. Stuart said he would prepare a briefing file on the proposal and authorization.
[Page 782]In the ensuing discussion it became clear that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] did not favor the proposal. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] no money had passed and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had not spoken to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] about it. He said, however, that the Ambassador had made a commitment to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], but speculated that no specific amount of money had been mentioned. (The authorization is for an amount up to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].)
Mr. Stuart reminded Mr. Bundy that Ambassador Martin had inspired the proposal and that Mr. Helms had presented it to the 303 Committee without arguing for it. However, Ambassador Martin, who had been present, had pushed for approval. The 303 Committee had apparently had some doubts about it, for it had gone to Higher Authority, where it had finally been approved.