Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

334. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Manila, October 26, 1966, 0440Z.

Secto 20/5304. For Bundy. Reference: Manila 4556.²

1. It is quite true that the Thai have been considering for some time whether or not it would be in their interests to send additional combat forces to South Vietnam. Thanatʼs motivation is the same as that of his Korean colleague, i.e., to use such increased contribution as a gambit to have a larger voice in determining the composition of any future peace conference and related/actions, dealing with command structure, etc. On the Thai military side, consideration has been given only to offering a medical unit.

2. If somehow we could specifically suggest that a battalion or perhaps two battalions of Thai Marines could be made available to serve with U.S. Marines, it would be a not unuseful contribution. I use the preceding formulation because part of the Thai political tradition keeps their marines away from Bangkok and from the northeast. It is therefore unlikely that they will be used in either suppression or civic action operations in the northeast. My second reason for coming down on the marines is that in my opinion they are professionally better trained with a higher morale and esprit de corps and would fit in very quickly with our Marine Corps, who have been responsible for their training over the last decade and a half. I therefore think they would make a more effective purely military contribution as a fighting force.

3. I would not recommend an army unit for several reasons. Unless General Westmoreland has changed his mind, he is in full agreement with me that the Royal Thai Army should be deeply engaged in two primary tasks—modernizing its structure and actively engaging in counterinsurgency and related civic action and “nation-building” activities within Thailand. A corollary reason in Westmorelandʼs mind is that the Thai Army provides a deterrent action on the Mekong flank and accordingly should not be diverted to Vietnam but should be maintained in position in Thailand.

4. We of course have one additional problem. The Thai are fully aware through their intimate contacts with their ROK colleagues of the nature of our support arrangements for the two Korean divisions. They would expect equal treatment for any forces they sent to Vietnam if the political advantage to us is worth that cost, it is something that we well might bring forward. If on the other hand this were used as an argument to try to defray these costs out of the currently hard-won MAP ceiling, we would have lost far more than we would have gained.

5. If you decide to make this direct pitch to the Thai, I would like to be informed soonest of such a decision and I think I could very quickly engage in a few behind-the-scenes conversations that might facilitate affirmative action on such a request.

6. With relation to third para reftel,³ Thanatʼs comment is not at all surprising. He had previously used the increasing dissatisfaction among the junior officers as an attempt to build a power base among this group for this own political future. As I have previously reported, and as you have undoubtedly observed, there is more than a small bit of Don Quixote in Thanat. He is perfectly capable of convincing himself that he can fashion a domestic power base which may bring him to the prime ministership. A curious and ironic twist is that, although he has no chance of doing so, if it were possible he would be presiding over a regime still based on the power element of his new military partners. Pote, on the other hand, has quite explicitly said it is not in the best interest of Thailand to take on the military head-on. He believes they can be brought along to acceptance of a constitutional regime and elections in the very near future. I think he is right. With Poteʼs full approval, I have consistently taken the position that, given a millennium of independence, I did not believe Americans had very much capability to advise on the internal structure of the Thai Government; that while we, based on our own cultural tradition, had evolved a different governmental pattern which we thought suited us very well, we recognized that it was difficult to export our system successfully without building up a generally accepted system of cultural values which would permit our system to work. I have said that only the Thai could decide when that time has come should they choose to adopt a regime like our own. This posture of nonintervention has permitted me to intervene even more deeply in pushing programs and governmental changes which will lead toward a liberalization of the regime. I personally think it would be a mistake for the President to become involved in this. If he does, I would suggest that he content himself with a private observation in the course of the bilateral meeting on Saturday to the effect that he had noted with interest and anticipation Pote Sarasinʼs comments before the National Press Club in Washington, adding that of course this was an internal matter, which only the Thai people and Government could decide in their own way and in their own time.

7. I think you may be completely certain that, if the President makes even this mild observation, Thanat will see to it that it is converted into a sweeping public Presidential endorsement of the necessity to proceed immediately to general elections. I do not believe it is in our interest to have such a distortion in circulation because it would be almost impossible to correct it.

Martin

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, S/S-Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 96. Secret; Exdis. Rusk was with the President at the Manila Conference to discuss Vietnam. Passed to the White House.
2. In telegram 4556 from Manila (Secto 21), October 26, Bundy stated that Thanat sought him out at Manila that day to say that he was strongly urging Prime Minister Thanom to send combat forces to South Vietnam. Bundy reported, however, when President Johnson made a “quiet plea” for other nations support on the previous day, the Thais made no discernible reaction. Telegram 4556 requested Martinʼs judgment. (Ibid.)
3. In the third paragraph of telegram 4456 from Manila, Bundy reported that Thanat expressed to him concern “that military elements in RTG were riding too high” and hoped that President Johnson could encourage Thai leaders at Manila to promulgate the new constitution and hold elections as soon as possible. (Ibid.)