The attached staff study of recent developments in Thailand was prepared
on the basis of readily available documents and discussions with staff
officers in ISA, DIA, and the State Department.
The paper indicates that events in Thailand are moving rapidly, rates of
insurgency have sharply increased, Thai utilization of MAP equipment has improved, the Thais are
anxious for U.S. advice and materiel assistance while retaining their
desire to solve their own internal problems. It further states that the
basic reports to Washington need to be expanded to permit a better and
more current assessment of the developing situation.
The attached memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
requests expanded reports on insurgent and counterinsurgent operations
in Thailand, on Thai military performance, and on the performance of
U.S. assistance programs. It will also request assessments of insurgent
threat to U.S. bases in Thailand, U.S./Thai military dependence on the
AID/Thai rural police program, the
implications of moving U.S. troops into Thailand under current
contingency plans, and the implications of losing U.S. bases in
Thailand.
Attachment
Staff Study Prepared in the Department of
Defense3
DEVELOPMENTS IN THAILAND
The Threat
Communist infiltration and activity in Thailand are accelerating and
will probably expand further in geographic scope and intensity over
the next year or two. This deterioration in the security situation
commenced in mid-1965. In part, it is due to increased U.S. activity
in Laos and North Vietnam conducted from bases in Thailand. Rather
complete “safe haven” training facilities have been located.
Incidents in Northeast Thailand in the first five months of 1966 are
greater than the total for all of 1965. Terrorism and ambush are
employed; officials, school teachers and government informants are
the principal targets. Estimates of 750 incidents of all kinds from
January 1–May 30, 1966 are reported, including about 200 fatalities.
(Regrettably, the availability of structured incident statistics at
the Washington level is weak.) Available evidence indicates that
during May the conflict between the RTG and the insurgents resulted
in at least 12 armed clashes, more than 40 casualties, and discovery
of at least 6 more communist camps. During the first four months of
1966, RTG security operations
captured 219 communists and induced 903 more to surrender.
Even more important than the outbreak of incidents is the central
point that between 500 and 1000 armed insurgents have free access to
the rural populations and have begun to develop an organization and
base of support for their activities against the government.
Discussions with staff officers in the concerned agencies reveal
agreement that insurgent activity in Thailand is definitely
increasing and is serious. Clearly, increased subversion activity in
areas adjacent to U.S. air bases at Takli, Ubon, Udorn and Korat is
cause for concern since these facilities are vulnerable.
The acceleration of communist and RTG
operations requires that the structure and content of basic reports
to Washington be improved to enable interested agencies to better
follow and assess the rapidly developing situation.
The Thai Response
Available evidence from State, DOD,
and CIA sources indicates that the
Thai are becoming concerned with the threat and are groping for
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ways to attack the
problem. MACTHAI and USOM consider
recent evidence of RTG concern in
their respective spheres of interest to be “dramatic.” The Thai
leadership elite is united under the leadership of Marshal Thanom,
and the key operating figure, General Praphat (Deputy Prime
Minister, Minister of Interior, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army)
has personally assumed command of all communist suppression
operations in Thailand. Further evidence of their concern is the
record of Thai accomplishments reported in the last six months.
Their achievements include exceeding the USAF standard utilization rates for certain aircraft
while flying counterinsurgency support missions; exceeding 6 months
ahead of schedule the agreed manning levels for Thai Army troop
units in Project 22 (a U.S. initiated joint program); increasing
total Thai Army troop strength from 83,840 on May 1, 1966, to 96,000
by June 30 (with plans to reach 103,000 by the end of CY 1966); and
increasing the defense budget by 27% for this fiscal year, with an
additional 20% predicted in the next fiscal year. Above all, the
Thai wish to minimize the involvement and presence of U.S.
personnel, an attitude which can be quite advantageous to us.
The Thai Contribution
Aside from reacting to the immediate internal threat, the Thai have
contributed without publicity to U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia
in the following ways:
- 1.
- Acceding without delay to every U.S. request to deploy
USAF and Army units to
Thailand, even at the cost of physical displacement from
their own bases.
- 2.
- Accepting almost all U.S. recommendations for construction
of military facilities to meet U.S. needs.
- 3.
- Approving every U.S. request for assistance on highly
classified operations.
- 4.
- Ignoring, until recently, the absence of a Status of
Forces Agreement covering U.S. troops, despite the fact that
every other major Asian ally of the U.S. has demanded
one.
- 5.
- Loaning aircraft and bombs from limited Thai war reserves
to meet U.S. emergency needs on Laos.
- 6.
- Providing pilots to fly T–28 missions in Laos.
- 7.
- Committing an artillery and infantry screen of 300 troops
(still there) to Laos who fought with distinction in
checking the Pathet Lao.
- 8.
- Providing cadre for most of the intelligence teams now
operating in enemy-held sections of Laos and North
Vietnam.
- 9.
- Agreeing to keep their unit in Korea to preserve the image
of a United Nations Force.
Lack of U.S. resolve in supporting the Thai in ways the Thai consider
meaningful could eliminate assets of this type, and hurt U.S. policy
and operations in Southeast Asia. We should not force the Thai to
“blackmail” the U.S. or increase the strain in the relationship.
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The U.S. Side
On a long term basis, the U.S. has undertaken clear commitments to
support the Thai. These commitments extend across the Eisenhower,
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations and have been progressively
strengthened. It has been consistent U.S. policy to encourage the
Thai to devote their resources to economic and social development,
and to minimize military programs. They have done so, which is
unusual for a military-dominated government, however
enlightened.
The U.S. response to the recent Thai insurgency threat has been
ambiguous. In view of the evidence at hand, the reasons for this
ambiguity are difficult to understand (there is an unusual degree of
unanimity at the staff officer level in every concerned agency that
the threat is real, the Thai response to U.S. recommendations has
been good, and the requests for help reasonable). The U.S.
reluctance to respond is in part based on dissatisfaction with past
performance by the Thai, and a belief that the Thai have not taken
the effective actions to counter the insurgency that are within
their resources and capability. These factors were evident in the
U.S. delay in granting the Thai request for temporary helicopter
augmentation. The Thai were disturbed by the slow U.S. response to
what they considered an urgent and legitimate request from an ally
in need.
There have been delays in the delivery of committed MAP items, and in supplying USOM police advisors. A brief review
of the MAP program, with specific
reference to the delivery situation, indicates that fair grounds do
exist for the Ambassadorʼs assessment of May 24, 1966, when he
pointed to “the rather shockingly poor United States record on the
military assistance side.” Even when a policy decision is made in
Washington to undertake a program, it is not necessarily carried out
automatically, and there is no follow-up to ensure implementation.
OSD might profitably consider
some inquiry into the latter question.
The nature of the relationship between DOD and AID programs
pertaining to rural security in Thailand is also hazy. The Thai have
taken some limited steps to organize civil, military and police
elements into an effective, unified counterinsurgency effort.
Coordination of U.S. performance in assisting this effort is uneven,
considering the separate and distinct AID, USIA and DOD programs.
Conclusions
It is difficult to understand why the U.S. does not have a
coordinated counterinsurgency plan for Thailand, especially in view
of the clear determination of the Thai to do the counterinsurgency
job themselves with minimal involvement of U.S. personnel. In view
of our commitments to the Thai, a clear determination of the U.S.
position is essential.
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The structure and content of basic reports to Washington needs to be
improved to enable interested agencies to better follow and assess
the rapidly developing situation.
