307. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Helms) to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

SUBJECT

  • The Security Situation in Thailand

Pursuant to your request at our meeting on 5 January,2 I would like to offer the following observations on the security situation in north Thailand. (I understand a full dress assessment of the situation is on the way from the Bangkok Country Team and should be in Washington some time next week. This will undoubtedly contain recommendations for counteraction.)3

The parts of Thailand in question are areas of traditional disaffection from the central government. These areas are racially allied to a large degree with groups in Laos and now Vietnam, with approximately 40,000 refugees from the latter. There has been, in the past few years, an increasing Communist concentration on agitation and organization within this area with Thailand being singled out by the Chinese Communist Government as the next country in Asia in which a war of national liberation would most likely develop. This statement was made by Vice Premier Chen Yi in January 1965 following the announcement of the Thai Independence Movement and the Thai Patriotic Front. Soon thereafter, two [Page 658] ex-members of the Thai parliament, Phayom Chulanond and Mongkhon Na Nakhon, who had earlier left Thailand for Communist China to evade arrest, were installed as spokesmen for these two exile front groups.

Since August 1965, several jungle camps have been discovered by Thai Security Services; and concurrently, intelligence reports began to indicate that Thai Communist cadre have received instructions to switch from the defensive to the offensive and since that time several jungle camps have been discovered. During 1965 there were over 30 attacks by subversives against government officials and police informants, with 25 occurring in the last half of the year. The most recent intelligence has indicated attacks on police and security installations.

The Thai Government reaction to this situation varied from initial disbelief that it was serious, to a later precipitate deployment of military forces up to and including air bombardment of suspected redoubt areas.

The Thai Government has been carrying out, with American support, a variety of programs aimed at showing Government concern with the rural areas, especially in the northeast, and improving the social and economic situation there. More recently, the Thai established a central command to exercise general authority over the suppression of insurgents.

The United States program of assistance to Thailand includes a number of elements targeted against the development of subversion or insurgency, and this program has been kept under regular review by the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). This U.S. assistance is given to expand civilian police programs, a village communications project, construction of security roads, Accelerated Rural Development, water development, local Government administrative development, Mobile Development Units, rural electrification, vocational education, etc.

[2 paragraphs (30 lines of source text) not declassified]4

Despite the current programs to improve the suppressive ability of the Thai Government and the extensive activities aimed at assisting the Thai Government to bring economic and social betterment to its rural population, I am much concerned that, unless this vital element of popular participation and commitment can be developed, our efforts may well be defeated. I assume that the forthcoming recommendations from the Country Team will address themselves to this subject.

Richard Helms 5
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/Executive Registry Files: Job 80–BO1676R, Box 4, Defense, Jan.–Dec., 1966. Secret.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. Transmitted in telegram 1428 from Bangkok, January 20, in which the Country Team stated that there was an intensification of an insurgency threat to northeast Thailand and recommended both short- and long-range programs to counter it. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–7 THAI)
  4. [text not declassified] January 7, attached but not printed.
  5. Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.