Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

285. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 11, 1964, 12:13–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• General Discussion

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Foreign Minister of Thailand Thanat Khoman
• Ambassador of Thailand Sukich Nimmanheminda
• Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs

1. South Viet-Nam Situation.

The President said that we were deeply concerned about the ineffectiveness and disunity in Saigon, and that this necessarily affected what we ourselves could plan to do. (Mr. Bundy noted that he had briefed the Foreign Minister fully on our immediate plans and views.²) The President said that the problem of getting the various groups to put the national unity ahead of their parochial welfare was a terribly trying one, and that we needed ideas from any quarter that would help us solve it.

Thanat responded that he had three specific thoughts:

a. He thought that the “so-called Buddhist movement” was in fact heavily political and was indeed infiltrated by the Communists to some degree.

b. Nonetheless, he thought it must be remembered that the Buddhists in general had had legitimate grievances under previous governments (obviously meaning Diem) and that there should be utility in trying to reason with them to see if greater understanding could not be reached. The President raised the question whether leading Buddhist groups or individuals in Thailand could play a part in reaching the Vietnamese Buddhists, and Thanat showed much interest in this proposition and implied that he would look into it.

c. That the situation in South Viet-Nam was being painted in the blackest possible tones by “friendly groups”—by which it became clear he meant the French in particular. (He did not indicate whether he was referring solely or predominantly to the official French, or rather to the private French community.) Mr. Bundy noted that Ambassador Taylor had reported there were no indications of truly hostile French political action, but that it was certainly true that the French consistently took the worst possible view at any given time, and that this had a bad effect on morale. The President said that Secretary Rusk should take this up with the French when he saw them at the NATO meeting. (Mr. Bundy later carried out this instruction.)

Thanat then referred to the value of some demonstrable military successes. Mr. Bundy commented that the Vietnamese armed forces had in fact given a very good account of themselves in several recent actions and the President urged that this be publicized more than was being done and asked that he himself be given such reports more than was now the case.

The President asked whether Thanat had further suggestions that might help the situation, and Thanat suggested that visits by South Vietnamese leaders to Thailand might be useful and could probably be arranged in the near future.

2. Southeast Asia Generally.

The President several times reaffirmed our appreciation of the firm Thai position and over Thai cooperation, referring specifically to such matters as military personnel in Laos.³ He expressed gratification that our two nations were seeing the basic problem so closely in the same terms, and Thanat returned this sentiment strongly. Thanat also referred to the indivisibility of the area and to the fact that any loss of South Viet-Nam would constitute an immediate threat to Thailand, beyond Thailand to Malaysia, and to the rest of the adjacent areas. He thought that Laos and Cambodia would be the first to be threatened, and could hardly hold out, and his implication was that Thailand would do its utmost, but that the issue would be in some doubt.

3. Thanat referred briefly to the desirability of certain additional assistance for highway development in the northeast, and Mr. Bundy noted that this had already been discussed between himself and Thanat and that we were prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study by AID. The President asked that he be given a report on the progress of this project when it matured.

4. In closing, following the presentation of a gift from Prime Minister Thanom—a letter from the Prime Minister was also delivered at the outset of the meeting, conveying general sentiments of support and appreciation—the President referred to our Peace Corps activity in Thailand and noted that the numbers have now reached 300. Thanat responded that this seemed to be going very well and that the Thai appreciated it.

5. During the course of the conversation Mr. Bundy mentioned that Thanat had made a most helpful statement to the press about the need for patience on the Viet-Nam problem, and the President expressed the hope that Thanat could hit this note when he saw the press following the meeting.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. II, Memos, 8/64–3/65. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Dairy. (Ibid.) The meeting was held at the White House. The Department of State copy of this memorandum indicates that it was approved by the White House on December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) Komer and McGeorge Bundy sent the President a briefing memorandum for this visit in which they stated that “the main thing is to add your strong assurance to him of our determination to check the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and to stand firmly behind our commitment to Thailand.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Thailand, Vol. II, Memos, 8/64–3/65) Rusk sent the President a December 9 briefing memorandum that also made this point. (Ibid.)
2. Thanat Khoman met with William Bundy in Bundyʼs office at 10:15 a.m., December 11. An account of that meeting is in a memorandum of conversation of that date. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. This sensitive information is the reason for the Limdis caption. [Footnote in the source text.]