Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

275. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹

Washington, June 17, 1964.

6914. Subject: US-Thai Planning (U). Ref: a. JCS 6669, DTG 052029Z, Jun 64;² b. CINCPAC DTG 091955Z, Jun 64.³

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the Secretary of Defense that you be authorized to conduct, on a continuing basis within the framework set forth in paragraph 2 below, such US-Thai bilateral military planning as you consider necessary for contingencies of joint interest.

2. The following guidance applies.

a. The purpose of bilateral US-Thai military planning is fourfold.

(1) To improve US-Thai readiness to execute measures envisaged.

(2) To assure maximum exploitation of Thai military resources in support of common US/Thai objectives.

(3) To reassure the Thai and to ensure their continued cooperation.

(4) To demonstrate a firm US resolve in Southeast Asia.

b. CINCPAC is the US representative for the development of such bilateral US-Thai plans as may be agreed upon for contingencies of joint interest to include.

(1) Defense of the Mekong. (In this regard, impress upon the Thais the need to move their forces rapidly to forestall enemy occupation of principal Mekong cities.)

(2) Punitive actions against Pathet Lao/Viet Minh forces in Laos.

(3) Reaction to continued or expanded DRV support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

(4) Insurgency in Thailand.

(5) Border incursions from Laos or Burma.

c. Development of the above plans should include detailed treatment of concept, force commitments, command relations, requirements for use of Thai facilities and US logistic support commitments to the Thai. Submit promptly, as they develop, questions in these fields requiring JCS policy consideration.

d. The general applicability of current unilateral and SEATO MPO plans to the above contingencies is noted. The content of US unilateral plans will not be revealed; however, illustrations of possible US reaction may be drawn therefrom.

3. Planning by means of a small planning group as outlined in reference b is considered appropriate. The CINCPAC senior planner will keep Ambassador and Deputy COMUSMACTHAI informed. The JCS do not plan to send representation to any consultations at this time, but probably will do so later.

4. You will be advised earliest of the Secretary of Defense decision in this matter. Meanwhile, pending receipt of JCS guidance, limit initial discussions with Thai to that outlined in reference b.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Vol. III, Memos A, 6/14–8/14. Top Secret. Drafted by Colonel H.H. Reichner of JCS (J–5) and released by D.C. Flickinger, Deputy Director, Implementation Division, JCS.
2. Not found.
3. In this CINCPAC telegram, June 9, Felt suggested sending a “small select group” to Bangkok headed by his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations to consult with the Thais on “concept forces and command relations in situation where the Communists are driving toward the Mekong.” Felt believed the U.S. Group should attempt to get Thai commitments and then proceed to discuss possible commitments of SEATO members. Felt recommended that these discussions begin at the working level. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 THAI–US)