Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

259. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, December 17, 1968, 1818Z.

288251. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. The action reported in your 23889,² I regret to say, cuts across the channel and the action which we have had in mind vis-à-vis Cambodia, and leaves out of account the difficult military situation which has caused us to hold up on that action. Under the circumstances, I believe it would be best if you let your initiative lie and said nothing further to Nong Kimny for the moment.

2. The background is that we have received a series of reports from the French and Australians, including a number of direct quotations of senior RKG officials—all in the direction of indicating that the LCU prisoners (and, we hope, the more recent helicopter crewman as well) would be released if we were to send a message from the President about doing our best to avoid action in Cambodia. Responsive to these reports, we have in fact been holding a draft message of the type apparently indicated.

3. However, military indicators in South Vietnam, in the last ten days, have given us grave concern. It has been clearly evident for some time that an exceptionally large number of NVA/VC forces are located in the Cambodian border areas, and the more recent evidence suggests strongly that these areas may become the principal launching bases for very sharp attacks in the area west of Saigon and conceivably into Saigon itself. If this should occur, we would plainly face the most difficult action decisions concerning Cambodia, and the coincidence of a Presidential message and subsequent essential military actions might be the reverse of helpful in terms of working toward a better relationship with Sihanouk.

4. This is the situation at the present time, of which—for obvious reasons of sensitivity—we have not believed it wise to keep you informed. We are continuing to keep the situation under the closest possible scrutiny and will now wish to consider whether something should be said quietly to Nong Kimny if and when we decide to act. However, I repeat that you should not seek further contact with Nong Kimny; if he should run into Spivack or yourself and ask, you should say simply that we are following the situation closely, that our basic policies remain unchanged, and that we hope to be able to move in a direction that will further an improvement in our relations with Cambodia. You should not mention any of the plans or considerations covered in paras 2 and 3 above.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–7 CAMB. Secret; Immediate, Nodis. Drafted by Bundy, cleared with Godley and Corcoran, and approved by Rusk.
2. In telegram 23889 from New Delhi, December 18, Bowles reported that he had contacted Cambodian Ambassador to India Nong Kimny and raised the idea of Bowles mediating U.S.-Cambodian differences. If President Johnson and Sihanouk both agreed, Bowles offered to fly secretly to Phnom Penh to arrange for release of the LCU prisoners in exchange for the promise of a U.S. declaration on Cambodiaʼs borders. Bowles reported that Nong Kimny seemed interested. (Ibid.)