Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

255. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, November 26, 1968, 1908Z.

24529. Dept pass for info to Bangkok, Canberra and Vientiane. Ref: Paris 24243.² Subject: French Ambassadorʼs Conversation with Sihanouk re US-Khmer Relations.

1. During lunch with Vance, Habib, and EmbOff on November 26, Manacʼh raised with us that French Ambassador in Phnom Penh (Dauge) had meeting with Sihanouk on November 24 in which Prince reiterated what Cambodian Foreign Minister had told French Ambassador November 19 that Cambodians would release US detainees if Sihanouk received personal message addressed to him from President Johnson and asked French to convey to Washington Sihanoukʼs sincere desire to improve relations with US.

2. Reading from Ambassador Daugeʼs telegram, Manacʼh said that Sihanouk—during November 24 meeting with French Ambassador—explained Cambodian position toward US and complained that he does not understand Washingtonʼs attitude. Sihanouk said that in his recent actions he went as far as he could, “without impairing his dignity”, of showing Cambodiaʼs willingness to improve relations with the US. Sihanouk then mentioned to French Ambassador increase in border incidents which he called “deliberate” and then said he planned send message to U Thant protesting latest (November 16) incident.

3. Sihanouk then told Ambassador Dauge that he was waiting for message from President Johnson on release of US detainees including reference to US efforts to institute restraints on military operations and on its military personnel near Cambodian border. Sihanouk complained that November 8 message by Secretary Rusk³ was not addressed to him personally but to Australian Ambassador. He said that President Johnson “takes no great risk” by writing to him directly and he told French Ambassador that he would answer Presidential message by releasing American prisoners. Sihanouk said that American detainees are burden for Cambodia and they take up space in building needed by Cambodian Navy. Sihanouk further said that he had instructed Prime Minister Penn Nouth to take line that American prisoners would be dealt with firmly but as French Ambassador aware, treating Americans in that manner would be contrary to Cambodian tradition.

4. Sihanouk then said that if President Johnson does not wish to write him directly, message from President-elect Nixon would also do. If President wants to write him, Sihanouk suggested that President may wish to use Sihanoukʼs public statements as hook on which to hang his message: In reply Sihanouk would order “forthwith” release of prisoners. Sihanouk stressed that “counter-part” he is asking for in exchange for release of American prisoners (i.e., Presidential message addressed to him personally) is “modest” indeed.

5. Sihanouk continued that release of American prisoners would free way for other questions such as recognition by US of Cambodian borders which could come later. It was at this point that Sihanouk asked French to help in convincing Washington of Sihanoukʼs sincere desire to improve Cambodiaʼs relations with US.

6. In commenting on his meeting with Prince, French Ambassador notes that Sihanouk makes some harsh statements about US to please Communist camp but on overall Ambassador Dauge impressed with pressing manner in which Sihanouk wants “to make overture to US”. Dauge thinks that Sihanoukʼs present policy is dictated partially by domestic political considerations because he hopes release of prisoners will only be first step leading to US recognition of Cambodian borders. He thinks Sihanouk needs US as counterbalance to DRV, NLF, and other Communist pressures because as Manacʼh himself put it, “France alone does not carry sufficient weight to provide that equilibrium.” Ambassador Dauge concludes his reports stressing again that important feature of any US message—and this also applies to message from Secretary if Presidential message not sent—that it be personal, addressed directly to Prince because any other kind of US message “could be considered offensive” by Sihanouk.

7. In discussing above telegram with us, Manacʼh said that French merely acting as channel of transmission. He added however that he personally thinks that at this juncture in political situation in Southeast Asia, it is in US interest to improve relations with Cambodia so that US can be instrumental in bringing about improvement in South Vietnamese-Cambodian relations especially if a solution in Vietnam requires closer ties between Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.⁴

Shriver

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 33–4 CAMB–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, but not passed to Bangkok, Vientiane, and Canberra by the Department as requested by the Embassy.
2. In telegram 24243 from Paris, November 21, the Embassy summarized more fully the conversation between French Ambassador Dauge and Cambodian Foreign Minister Norodom Phurissia. (Ibid.)
3. Transmitted in telegram 26727 to Saigon, November 7. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 24891 from Paris, December 5, Manacʼh told an Embassy official that French Ambassador to Cambodia Dauge had met Cambodian Foreign Minister Norodom Phurissara on November 28. The Cambodian stated “if Sihanouk received personal message from US President, US prisoners would be released within following half-hour.” (Ibid.)