241. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- General Cambodian Posture
Over the past six months, following the Bowles Mission, events have been working gradual changes in the attitude of the Cambodian [Page 535] Government on issues that affect its basic posture toward the US and therefore, by extension, the outlook for a post-war settlement in Southeast Asia. Distrust has developed over Vietnamese and Chinese involvement in a domestic insurgency which the RKG, despite rather extraordinary efforts, has not been able to bring under control.
Sihanoukʼs awareness of the Communistsʼ use of his territory and their exploitation of his people has been signaled in various ways. His own words make clear his feeling of the gravity of the situation and his assessment that internal Communist subversion, externally supported, is his number one problem. His recent special broadcast to the nation on July 8 was notably vigorous in its warning of the dangers of deceitful friendship on the part of the Chinese Communists.
The recent shift in the Cambodian cabinet with the elevation of Lon Nol to the position of First Deputy Prime Minister hints a stiffening of the Government in its anti-Left posture. It also suggests, through the departure of Son Sann, some disputes within Sihanoukʼs official family over the current state of affairs.
The Paris talks, at which the RKG, despite certain disclaimers, will most likely wish to have the ear of the Free World for Cambodian views on any general settlement of the Southeast Asian conflict, has important relevance to Cambodian developments. Sihanouk, in other words, is acting, or reacting, with a canny eye both on the war and on the peace talks. His peculiar position makes it essential that he be able to come to terms with whatever pattern develops out of the present complexities for the future of Southeast Asia and that he be able to live within it and maintain the identity of his nation. This of course helps to explain his almost paranoid and continuing insistence on the importance of otherwise rather meaningless governmental statements respecting and recognizing Cambodiaʼs territorial integrity “within its present frontiers.”
Despite a notable undercurrent of changing attitudes, Cambodian propaganda (which means Sihanoukʼs official statements) continues to be aligned against the US and our allies in Southeast Asia. In a curious contradiction, Sihanouk can revel in the luxury and perhaps temporary comfort obtained from his denunciations of the US, since he in fact is not fundamentally apprehensive of US intentions with respect to his country, while he is afraid of the Chinese and is the heir of a long tradition of Cambodian/Vietnamese hostility. His deep and abiding fear is of a Vietnamese-Thai squeeze that would in effect liquidate his kingdom.
There seems to be no doubt that Sihanouk has become increasingly concerned over the past six months at VC/NVA violation of his neutrality. While we have no official word from him as to his reaction to the information we have forwarded him in pursuance of the Bowles-Son Sann communiqué, we do know that he has in fact taken some steps against the VC on the basis of information we have furnished. For the first time of [Page 536] which we are aware, Cambodian publications have reported within the past month the expulsion of Viet Cong forces, by name, from Cambodia. However, the Cambodian Government continues to charge us with border violations and on occasion has called on the International Control Commission to confirm such violations, while saying nothing of VC/NVA use of their territory.
In this complex situation, we are confronted with a problem which involves on the one hand the good faith before the world of our respect for a small nationʼs territorial integrity, and on the other hand grave threats to the security of our forces in Viet-Nam.
The whole form and fabric of Southeast Asia in the post-war world is involved. Cambodia is seeking accommodation with the powers concerned, maintaining room to maneuver, and always working to pick the winner and hence guarantee its own existence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB. Secret. Drafted by Trent and approved by Corcoran.↩