Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

217. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland)¹

Washington, December 6, 1967, 0154Z.

4472. References: A: MACJ00 40588;² B: CINCPAC 051230Z Dec 67.³

1. Recommendations set forth in references were discussed extensively at highest level conference this evening.⁴ Decision was made against an immediate affirmative decision stemming from the political problems involved, foreign and domestic, and uncertainty that military results obtained would be commensurate with the political penalties incurred.

2. In amplification of the above, there was exploration of other means of putting pressures on Cambodia by more direct political démarches and by such actions as closing the Mekong River, etc. Apropos of this, questions were raised as to the quality of the evidence we now have; i.e., do the aerial photographs taken to date support adequately and unmistakenly the validity of our charge that NVA troops are located in and operating from Cambodian sanctuaries. Also, there was doubt expressed as to casualties which would be inflicted on the enemy in view of their possible dispersed positions and anticipated efforts to scatter as soon as the first bombs go down. The thought was expressed that, if possible, it would be expedient to provide a cover for Sihanouk to avoid driving him into the arms of the ChiComs by using artillery in lieu of air strikes to punish the enemy; the thought here being that use of artillery could be justified on the basis of returning fire across the border.

3. Perhaps the most important part of the discussion centered about the realization that your recommendation really is part of a larger problem; namely, that of permitting North Vietnamese and VC units to operate from Cambodian sanctuaries wherein they are immune to any form of counteraction. In other words, everyone recognized the weightiness and the pressing importance of the larger problem in connection with achieving our objectives in Southeast Asia.

4. As a result of this meeting I require ASAP your views concerning the following:

A. For what length of time do you anticipate the first NVA division will be disposed in its present vulnerable position?

B. How high is your confidence in the quality of your targeting; i.e., do you think that the B–52 strikes can be expected to be on target?

C. Related to the above question, how many targets would you estimate would be available for fighter-bomber strikes?

D. What is the pattern of enemy deployment at present—are they widely dispersed in bivouacs or are they occupying relatively compact temporary camps?

E. What casualties would you anticipate inflicting on the enemy?

F. If the strikes are as successful as you anticipate, what would be the reduction in enemy capabilities you would anticipate and for how long?

G. Regarding other means of achieving the same objectives, can you employ artillery in lieu of aircraft; can you draw fire by means of patrols to which you can respond, etc?

H. What other pressures of a political and economic nature, such as closing the Mekong River, would you advise?

5. I will issue instructions relative to increased aerial reconnaissance in the Cambodian area to include low-level reconnaissance. I would like to have from you any additional recommendations which will assist you in locating enemy facilities and activities and which will support U.S. Government pressures on Sihanouk to obtain his cooperation in dealing with the North Vietnamese Army/VC threat to your forces.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Cambodia, 5 E(1)a, 5/66–1/68. Top Secret; Immediate; Specat; Exclusive. No drafting officer appears on the source text; Wheeler approved the transmission. Repeated to Sharp.
2. Document 213.
3. In CINCPAC telegram 01230Z, December 5, Sharp supported Westmorelandʼs recommendations in Document 213. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 5 E(1)a, 5/66–1/68, Cambodia)
4. See Document 216.