Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

215. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 5, 1967, 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a possible agenda for the conduct of the meeting at 6:00 p.m. today² on the question of bombing Communist troops in Cambodia. (Tab A)³

1. What military results can be expected from the 72-hour air offensive? (Gen. Wheeler)

2. How do the forces now regrouping in Cambodia relate to those believed to be coming down the Laos trails? (Gen. Wheeler) (See Tab B)

3. What is the state of our approach through the Australians to Sihanouk on the use of his territory by the Communists? (Sec. Rusk)

4. Is it certain that the 72-hour attack would leak? (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

5. What would Sihanoukʼs reaction be to this attack? (Sec. Rusk)

6. What will be the reaction in the U.S. if it becomes known that we are permitting Cambodian territory to be used as a sanctuary for the rest and re-fit of enemy forces? (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

WWR comment: My own judgment is:

• —It would be bad to make this attack at a time when the Australians have just (yesterday) put the evidence before the Cambodians; but
• —Given the likely intensity of the conflict in the weeks and months ahead along the Cambodian frontier, we shall not be able to live with this sanctuary;
• —Therefore, you may wish to decide that, in turning down Westy on this occasion, it is essential that we make it clear to Sihanouk that we cannot live with these arrangements and he had better do something about them.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Cambodia. Top Secret; Extremely Sensitive.
2. See Document 216.
3. Apparent reference to Document 213.