Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

205. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group (Unger) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, May 1, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Initial Report by the Joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia

1. Pursuant to a suggestion to you from Deputy Secretary Vance, agreement was reached last December on the establishment of Joint Study Group under Department of State Chairmanship to discuss means of dealing with the problem of Viet Cong-North Vietnamese use of Cambodia. In addition to State, representatives of the Department of Defense and CIA participated in the study and USIA was included in the discussions of psychological operations.

2. The Study Group has now completed its initial report which I am submitting to you at Tab A. In this report (pages 1–4) you will find a summary and a series of recommendations which provide the essence of our findings. It is our hope that the report will serve as a policy and operating guide for the Cambodian question as it relates to the war in Viet-Nam. The report is labeled “initial” in recognition of the need to reassess its findings regularly.

3. If you approve the report I recommend that you forward it to Messrs. Vance and Helms (see draft letter at Tab B)² and invite their approval as well. Once the report is approved I would recommend also providing an information copy to Mr. Marks, USIA.

4. As the work of the Study Group proceeded we were able to reach immediate agreement on certain recommended actions and authorization was given to proceed with these forthwith as noted in the report, beginning on page 26. In addition to those actions, primarily in the military field, we have also been proceeding with diplomatic and informational activities.

5. With respect to certain other recommended actions, the Study Group deferred decision in one instance and in the remaining cases decided it was inadvisable to approve the actions under present circumstances. These deferred and disapproved proposals are discussed in the report starting on page 30. The deferred decision concerns certain limited ground reconnaissance operations, including the participation of US personnel, in a limited area of Northeast Cambodia adjacent to South Viet-Nam and Laos (code name: Daniel Boone). Because of the sensitivity of these operations I wished them to be considered at a high level in the Department but I recommend that they be approved since I consider the military utility high and the risk of exposure low.

Recommendations³

6. It is recommended that you:

a) Approve the Initial Report (Tab A) of the Study Group and sign the letters transmitting it to Defense and CIA (see Tab B).

b) Approve the Daniel Boone operation recommended by the Study Group and concur in the transmittal of the messages contained in Tab K of the Initial Report.

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Attachment⁴

Initial Report of the Joint Department of State-Department of Defense-Central Intelligence Agency Study Group on Cambodia

I. Summary and Recommendations

Following a SEACOORD meeting in November 1966, which focussed attention on the increasing seriousness of the problems of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese use of Cambodia, USIB undertook a restudy of the problem in an effort to evaluate its relative significance to our military effort in Vietnam. That study, completed on January 26, 1967, concludes inter alia that VC/NVA use of Cambodia: (1) does not constitute a decisive element in the enemy capability for conducting military operations in Vietnam; (2) is of considerable psychological and military advantage to them; and (3) is likely to increase further during the coming year.⁵

Based on the USIB study, an interdepartmental Study Group, representing State, OASD/ISA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and CIA (with USIA participation on psychological operations) has been meeting since early February under Ambassador Ungerʼs chairmanship to consider what additional actions might be taken to deal with this problem. In particular, the Study Group has examined in detail proposals submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an expansion of existing ground and aerial intelligence collection activities, psychological operations, and immediate pursuit of VC/NVA forces on Cambodian soil.

In considering the JCS proposals, the Study Group has worked from the premises that, for the present, our efforts to deal with this problem should continue to be primarily in the political sphere and should be on a priority basis. Provocative actions which would seriously prejudice the success of such efforts and threaten to expand the combat into Cambodia should be avoided. However, those actions which are clearly required in terms of self-defense of our forces in South Vietnam should continue to be authorized as necessary.

Although recognizing the limited capability of the Cambodians to control their frontiers, the Study Group noted recent developments in Cambodia which seem to offer an improved prospect for getting the Cambodian Government to take more effective action to reduce the advantage VC/NVA forces derive from use of Cambodian territory. The Study Group supported a stepped up plan of political/diplomatic action aimed at getting Cambodian cooperation or acquiescence in dealing with this problem and bringing about an improvement in US-Cambodian relations.

In view of the increased concern over VC/NVA activity in Cambodia and in order to obtain a clearer picture of the extent of such activity and its effect upon military operations in South Vietnam, measures designed to expand air intelligence collection programs and which carry tolerable political risks have been approved. An expanded leaflet operation to reach VC/NVA forces in relatively sparsely populated border areas of Cambodia has also been approved and a psychological operations plan prepared for use as authorized (Tab H). Other proposals involving actions by US forces on Cambodian territory, which would have been difficult to conceal and involved high risk of further worsening our relations with Cambodia, have been deferred pending further diplomatic efforts to reach some understanding with Cambodians which could lead to an improvement in the existing situation. These proposals are covered in detail in Section V of the report.

The recommendations of the Study Group are as follows:

(1) that the Study Groupʼs initial report be adopted as the basis for actions concerning Cambodia taken by the respective agencies involved, in particular Section IV (Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action) and Section V A. (Approved Actions.)

(2) that Daniel Boone-type operations in the border zone of Northeastern Cambodia be authorized on a case-by-case basis as described in Tabs K and L.⁶

(3) that those proposals in Section V A. that were partially implemented and those proposals in Section V B. that were deferred in their entirety, at appropriate intervals be reviewed and considered for expansion or implementation.

(4) that the Study Group meet as necessary on an ad hoc basis where new developments call for consideration of recommendations for specific actions going beyond the guidelines laid down in this report.

(5) that in any case the Study Group reconvene for a comprehensive review of the situation after a three month period.

[Here follow section II, “The Nature of the Problem,” section III, “U.S. Policy, section IV, “Political/Diplomatic Plan of Action,” section V, “Proposals Considered by the Study Group and Action Taken,” and Tabs A–M, and Annexes I and II.]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret. Drafted by Unger and initialed by Kohler.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Katzenbach approved both recommendations on May 9.
4. Top Secret; Limdis.
5. Special National Intelligence Estimate 57–67: Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort. [Footnote in the source text; see Document 199.]
6. In JCS telegram 5937 to CINCPAC, May 22, the Joint Chiefs informed CINCPAC that Daniel Boone cross-border operations for northeastern Cambodia were approved subject to certain restrictions: The area was limited; reconnaissance teams were to total not more than 12 men (with no more than 3 U.S. advisers); tactical airstrikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces into Cambodia was not approved; infiltration and exfiltration would be by foot; mission time would be kept to the minimum; all precautions should be taken to avoid contact with Cambodians; purpose of the operation was intelligence and verification; no more than three missions could be undertaken at one time; missions required prior JCS approval with notification of the Department of State; and the operations would not be acknowledged. (Department of Defense, JCS Official Records, 880/211 (22 May 67) IR 2278)6