Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

145. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, August 24, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Possible Security Council Meeting on Cambodia-Viet-Nam

At the moment, although the GVN Observer in New York appears anxious for a Security Council meeting, we have no indication yet that the GVN Foreign Ministry desires such a meeting on the Cambodia-Viet-Nam border problem. In examining the advantages and disadvantages of requesting a meeting to consider the recommendations made by the SC Mission to Cambodia and Viet-Nam, we have concluded that it would not be advisable to take or encourage any initiative for formal Council consideration at this time.

We expect both the Soviets and the French to work against any constructive implementation of the Missionʼs proposals for an Observer Group or a border demarcation unit. There are indications that Morocco and the Ivory Coast would be reluctant to support the recommendations in the face of the French attitude and the clear Cambodian rejection of the recommendations.² A lukewarm or negative attitude on the part of Morocco and the Ivory Coast would be particularly damaging, of course, since they were two of the three nations represented on the Mission which formulated the recommendations.

Nevertheless, while it is tempting to again seek the establishment of UN machinery along the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam border and to box Sihanoukʼs ears, I believe the advantages would be outweighed by the following disadvantages:

1. Explicit failure to agree on the Missionʼs recommendations might reinforce the view that the United Nations cannot play a useful role in Southeast Asia in the absence of a general political settlement.

2. A meeting now would give the Soviets, the Czechs, Cambodia, and the French a further opportunity to demand a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

3. A meeting would give the Soviet Union another occasion to air its position about U.S. actions in the Tonkin Gulf. We consider such a move manageable from our point of view; nevertheless, as you know we thought it best to quit in the Council while we were ahead on this subject.

4. We have been inching the Indians along toward a more constructive effort in Southeast Asia. There are signs of a possible constructive initiative in the future by the Indians to replace the ICC in Laos with UN inspection machinery. A propaganda exchange in the Security Council at this time could slow down or complicate this process.

For the above reasons, we believe it best not to have a Council meeting on Cambodia-Viet-Nam now. We do, however, see merit in a GVN letter to the Security Council President for the obvious propaganda purposes and shall urge the Vietnamese to proceed in this sense.

USUN shares these views. Embassy Saigon states that it sees no advantage in convoking a new Security Council meeting on the RKG charges.

Recommendation:

That the United States neither take nor encourage any initiative to reconvene the Security Council on the Cambodia-Viet-Nam border question.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Kimball and cleared by Green and Corcoran.
2. Sihanouk and the National Assembly of Cambodia jointly and formally rejected the findings of the report of the Security Council Mission on August 30. For the rejection as transmitted to the Security Council, September 9, see UN doc S/5952. Therefore, although a meeting would not result in constructive action on the Missionʼs proposals, the debate would offer opportunity to contrast in dramatic fashion the GVNʼs willingness to cooperate with the UN and the RKGʼs intransigence on the matter. It would thus bolster the GVNʼs morale and make its case better understood in the world. We could also bring out in the debate the incongruity of the Cambodian position in bringing their complaints to the attention of the Security Council and then refusing to permit the establishment of any impartial international body either to investigate the charges or to protect them against the alleged attacks and incursions. We would also hope, thereby, to stem the still incessant flow of Cambodian complaints of border violations or at least reduce the complaint to a subject of ridicule in the eyes of most UN members. With respect to the “toxic powders” accusations, the Council might obtain for us an impartial investigation and/or the reduction in credibility of the RKG statements.
3. Rusk initialed his approval.