Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

140. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, July 4, 1964, 6 p.m.

85. Reference: Deptels 7098 and 25; Embtel 82.² I had half-hour conversation with Sihanouk July 3 and will set down briefly what he said.

After Sihanouk expressed appreciation for the Presidentʼs message and proposed a toast to his health and that of U.S. to which I reciprocated, I mentioned to Sihanouk that arrival of Kidder as new Ambassador would be good starting point for improvement of relations with Cambodia which U.S. genuinely desired. Sihanouk agreed and said he looked forward very much to receiving Amb Kidder and added he greatly regretted departure of “my good friend Sprouse” whom he had found “understanding and sympathetic”.

After this exchange of courtesies Sihanouk went into description or dissertation (there was no heat or excitement in any of his statements) regarding what he termed chief interest of his country. He said that for centuries past Cambodia had had traditional enemies, Vietnamese and Thais. During French period frontier between Vietnam and Cambodia had been marked out. With Thais there had been formal treaty negotiated and signed in Washington in 1947. All he was asking for these countries was that they formally accept frontier which had been drawn up. He referred in this connection to case brought to International Court of Justice which had been decided in Cambodiaʼs favor. He said in addition to “military intrusion” into Cambodian territory, Vietnam had also at some point during recent past attempted to move its frontiers four kilometers into Cambodia, he said difference in architecture between houses in Cambodian villages and those in Vietnam was quite distinctive. If he had been able to obtain Vietnamese and Thai agreement to what he termed to be legal frontiers of Cambodia, he would not have ever proposed conference. Conference was necessary because he had not gotten anywhere with Vietnamese or Thais. In this connection, he mentioned letter from Diem to him in 1960 laying claim to certain islands in Cambodiaʼs possession of its coast. This letter, he said, should be withdrawn. I told him I was not sufficiently up on all of details of frontier question but it seemed to me that while it was very important matter and I could understand his concern nevertheless there was the greater danger of communism emanating from north which was our chief preoccupation. I pointed out that we had no interest in area and certainly supported Cambodiaʼs doctrine of neutrality. Sihanouk then said that in his view whether the country was red or white made little difference. It was matter of relative unimportance to him whether he continued as ruler of Cambodia or was assassinated by Communists, provided that nation of Cambodia continued. It was for this reason that he had put so much emphasis on establishment of the frontiers of his country. He said that if frontiers were recognized there would be no need for Geneva Conference. He added that he had never envisaged any such conference in and even dealing with anything but Cambodia. He appeared to attach difficulties with U.S. entirely to frontier question, pointing out that while he could understand why we were supporting non-Communist govts of area, nevertheless this automatically put U.S. on side of countries hostile to Cambodia and under such circumstances we could hardly expect good relations with Cambodia. He also mentioned some subversive broadcasts against him and when I questioned this thesis, he mentioned that the Cambodians had “proof” that an “American diplomat” of Japanese descent, Matsui or Watsui, was involved. I told him I would like to warn him against acceptance of unverified stories involving intelligence and all other matters, and I felt that they could not help situation.

When I told him in regard to previous point that U.S. was nevertheless not in position to dictate policies to other countries, since we did not go in for “satellites”, he said that he had heard this before and therefore was forced to accept it. In reply to my statement that U.S. was fully determined and conscious of all risks involved, to prevent takeover by Communists of entire area, Sihanouk said he understood this but that he must state frankly he thought we could not succeed. Conversation then ended on very agreeable and friendly manner.

Comment: I do not know all of intricacies of frontier question but it seemed to me that to him this was most important element in situation. I found his emphasis on nation as against regime of interest and a thesis which must have been music to De Gaulleʼs ears.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 CAMB. Confidential. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Bangkok.
2. In telegrams 7098 and 25 to Paris, June 30 and July 2, the Department suggested that Bohlen use the transmission of a greeting from President Johnson thanking Sihanouk for a similar message to discuss prospects for U.S.-Cambodian relations. (Both ibid.) In telegram 82 from Paris, July 3, the Embassy reported that Bohlen met Sihanouk at 6:30 p.m. that day and that a report of their conversation would follow. (Ibid.)