Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, May 21, 1964, 9:15 p.m.

901. As you know, Stevenson in major speech today,² while leaving open possibility of Committee of Inquiry as suggested by Cambodia, made three practical suggestions for possible UN peacekeeping machinery designed to meet security problem along Cambodian-Vietnamese border. He mentioned as possibilities:

(1) bilateral force which might report to Secretary-General;

(2) bilateral force augmented by UN observers; or

(3) an all UN force.

Thus far, Cambodians have laid great stress on convening Geneva conference as immediate objective while continuing to reaffirm their desire for Committee of Inquiry which would look into past incidents. They also have stressed Geneva conference should authorize ICC to cope with border problems between Cambodia and Viet-Nam. Cambodian Del appears to have rejected or at least ignored US concrete proposals cited above in his intervention before Council.

It is clear that if Cambodians were serious about desiring useful solutions at UN, they should be prepared to support kind of practical on-the-ground UN instrumentalities suggested in Stevenson speech. Positive action by Council could result in situation where Cambodiaʼs stated concern for its territorial integrity would be met in quick and practical way which could not be done through repetition of Geneva conference.

If Cambodia can be brought to see possibilities of constructive action in UN, RKG must be disabused of idea that SC will endorse convocation of Geneva Conference. We understand SYG has already informed Sonn that Cambodia could not expect to get required majority for res endorsing Geneva conference.

We do not believe Cambodians have come to SC to seek any practical arrangements for coping with border problem, but we feel that if facts are made clear, their position will be smoked out and onus put on them for helping transform SC consideration into propaganda show rather than practical exercise in peacekeeping.

For Phnom Penh: We recognize our credit with Cambodians almost non-existent and that direct approach in Phnom Penh probably futile. Nevertheless, if you feel it advisable, you might approach suitable level RKG to discuss foregoing. In doing so, you might wish draw attention to following passage of Stevensonʼs speech:

“Let me emphasize, Mr. President, that my government has the greatest regard for Cambodia and its people and its Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk. We believe he has done much for his people and for the independence of his country. It is our very clear impression that his overwhelming purpose is merely to assure conditions in which his people can live in peace, secure from outside intervention, and work out their own destiny in their own fashion. My government wishes no more than to associate itself explicitly with these aims. If the people of Cambodia wish to live in peace and security and independence—free from outside intervention, and free from external alignment if they so choose—then we want for them precisely what they want for themselves. We have no quarrel whatsoever with the Cambodian desire to go its own way.”

In drawing attention to this passage you might add that we would be prepared to consider other practical suggestions for UN action which the RKG might wish to make in order to meet the frontier situation. You should add that USG would be prepared to help finance kind of UN operation we are talking about and would affirmatively support provision in a Security Council resolution which would call on all states to respect territorial integrity and political independence of Cambodia.

For USUN: In view fact you have good contacts with Sonn request you make approach to him along foregoing lines.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Hirschfeld, Buffum, and Patrica M. Byrne of UNP, cleared by Trueheart, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Saigon.
2. Printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 848–851, and in full in Department of State Bulletin, June 8, 1964, pp. 907–913.