Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, March 26, 1964, 6 p.m.

1026. It may help to clarify complex considerations involving Geneva Conference, Quadripartite Conference, bilateral negotiations, etc., if we attempt place ourselves in Sihanoukʼs position and gain some idea of pressures he feels on him. Assuming always that we are dealing with basically rational individual, this may provide us with clues as to his twistings and turnings past few weeks. Basic elements of Sihanoukʼs world, then, as we see it, are:

1) He is genuinely fearful for continued survival his country. This factor has been stressed in Embassyʼs reporting over many months. Sihanouk is convinced Thais and Vietnamese (either Communist or non-Communist) will, unless externally restrained, inevitably attempt complete age-old process nibbling away at Cambodia.

2) While he is convinced Vietnamese Communists, backed by ChiComs, will eventually win war in Viet-Nam, he cannot be sure this will happen soon enough to prevent South Viet-Nam from inflicting considerable damage on Cambodia. Thus he has acute problem of timing in seeking some arrangement to hold SVN in check for time being while attempting consolidate his position with DRVN before latterʼs actual victory.

3) Only method he sees for assuring Cambodiaʼs future is to obtain commitments from each and every party likely to have significant role in SEA in foreseeable future, thus he desires assurances (guarantees if he can get them) from US, French, USSR, ChiComs, GVN, Thais and DRVN. He particularly wants US commitment as restraint on Thais and SVN and ChiCom and Soviet commitment as restraint on Hanoi.

4) Although by force of repetition Sihanouk has apparently come to look on holding of Geneva Conference as end in itself, he has consistently defined its major purpose as neutralization of Cambodia in some form of international framework.

5) Bilateral arrangements with SVN, especially bilateral arrangements which would involve a cooperative effort in preventing Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory, would be of value to him only for what he believes is the short period remaining before Viet Cong and Hanoi take over. Such arrangements could, on other hand, represent real danger to him after that expected takeover, since they could provide pretext for Communist Vietnamese regime (and it must be kept in mind that for Cambodians all Vietnamese are potential enemies) to punish Cambodia because of cooperation provided SVN.

6) Sihanouk realizes there will be no place for him in Communist Cambodia which would be inevitable result Communist victory in SVN.

7) We see no evidence yet that ChiComs and DRVN have shown willingness provide economic and military aid and guarantees to degree hoped for by Sihanouk, thus creating doubts as to their ultimate intentions toward Cambodia.

8) All else aside, Sihanouk cannot, anymore than any other ruler, continue to tolerate repeated violations his countryʼs territory and attacks on its people by outside forces.

Faced with above pressures pulling him in many different directions, little wonder Sihanoukʼs responses resemble those of small, intelligent trapped animal desperately seeking exit from trap, dashing back and forth all directions, and keeping up continuous high-pitched shrieking.

In face of all of this, would appear in our overall interest attempt steer steady course which, while not making concessions to Sihanouk at expense our commitments Thailand or Viet-Nam or damaging to latterʼs war effort, would equally avoid pushing Sihanouk against wall and driving him into desperation. Elements of such steady course might well be following:

1) Firm but dispassionate statement now that we shall not attend Geneva Conference on Cambodia in any circumstances. This statement would be designed reassure Thais and Vietnamese, while making clear to Sihanouk we are not going to be pressured into changing our minds. Even if we could trust Sihanoukʼs assurances, we cannot rely on his ability prevent ChiComs, USSR, or DRVN from introducing neutralization of Viet-Nam into Geneva conference, once it is underway.

2) Possibly simultaneous unilateral public statement our respect for Cambodiaʼs neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity within the limits of such boundaries as are agreed upon between Cambodia and its neighbors in accordance with equity and law.

3) Public expression of willingness to support some kind of agreed international mechanism to supervise and control Cambodiaʼs boundary with SVN; agreement on form of mechanism to be reached through diplomatic channels or possibly small meeting of parties directly concerned.

4) Genuine and effective effort prevent GVN and, above all, US advisors with ARVN, from penetrating Cambodian territory. (In this connection, incidentally, do not like to contemplate problem which might face us should an American advisor be captured by Cambodians while on Cambodian territory, which came very close to happening in case of L–19 downed near Chantrea.)

In regard to point 4 above, we cannot reconcile suggestion in paragraph 2 Saigonʼs 1818² that we reduce restrictions on Vietnamese military operations with objective expressed in that same message of seeking ways reconcile GVN-RKG differences. In fact, whole approach present message is predicated on theses that (a) use currently being made by Viet Cong of Cambodian territory is less than critical to GVN war effort and (b) that free hand for GVN in eliminating such use is not worth risk that this will drive Cambodia into intimate collaboration with Viet Cong or otherwise bring about escalation SVN war. If these are judged invalid, then we should logically write off Cambodia, remove all Americans from this country, and concentrate on winning war in Viet-Nam without regard to what happens here, provided, of course, we willing to accept damage this would involve to our world position as respector of rights of small nations.

Deptel 725³ received with serious garbles after this message drafted, being serviced and studied with view to commenting soonest.

Spivack

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Secret; Immediate; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, the White House, Department of Defense, JCS, and CIA. Passed to USUN.
2. Dated March 24. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 725 to Phnon Penh, March 25, contained a draft letter from Rusk to Sambath on assurances for Cambodiaʼs neutrality and territorial integrity which the Department stated “concedes nothing essential from the standpoint of RTG or GVN while at the same time giving us a defensible posture vis-à-vis French and British, as well as publicly.” (Ibid.) The letter was not sent.